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Charged, tried, and convicted of capital murder, the
condemned man waits for death.1 Having exhausted his direct
trial appeals, 2 he sought relief on collateral grounds. 3 Federal
habeas corpus counsel was appointed for him.4 During
* J.D. St. John's University School of Law, June 2004; B.S. The University of Arizona
1995. The author wishes to thank his parents for their steadfast support.
1 See Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d 586, 590 (E.D.Va. 1999) (indicating that a
jury convicted Walter Mickens of capital murder during the commission of attempted
forcible sodomy on June 3, 1993 and sentenced him to death on June 7, 1993); Across the
U.S.A.: News From Every State, U.S.A. TODAY, June 9, 1993, at 10A (reporting that a
Newport News jury recommended death for Walter Mickens for stabbing Timothy Hall).
See generally Letter from Diann Rust-Tierney, ACLU Capital Punishment Project & Kent
Willis, ACLU of Va., to Mark R. Warner, Governor of Va. available at
http://archive.aclu.org/death-penalty/Mickensiletter.html (May 24, 2002) (requesting
clemency for Walter Mickens, who was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
death in the Commonwealth of Virginia).
2 See Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 592 (explaining that after unsuccessful
appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Supreme Court of the United States
remanded Mickens' case for further consideration in light of Simmons v. South Carolina,
512 U.S. 154 (1994), and that the Supreme Court of Virginia thereafter remanded the
matter to the trial court for resentencing); Mickens v. Commonwealth, 478 S.E.2d 302,
303 (Va. 1996) (concluding upon reconsideration that the holding in Simmons required a
remand of the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing); Mickens v.
Commonwealth, 457 S.E.2d 9, 10 (Va. 1995) (stating that the holding in Simmons
required a remand of Mickens' case for resentencing).
3 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 164 (2002) (explaining that Mickens filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in June 1998 alleging that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel because one of his court-appointed attorneys had a conflict of
interest at trial); Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 592-93 (showing that after denial
of his appeal by the Supreme Court of Virginia, Mickens filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus with the same court). See generally United States Supreme Court: Selected
Cases, 3 W. VA. CRIM. L. NEWSL. (Aug. 2002) (summarizing case facts and holding),
availableat http://www.wvpds.org/Newsletter/Aug2002.html.
4 See Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 592 (showing that counsel were appointed
to represent Mickens in filing a federal habeas corpus petition). See generally Mickens v.
Taylor, 535 U.S. at 164 (explaining that federal habeas counsel uncovered a conflict of
interest involving Mickens' lead trial attorney); United States Supreme Court: Selected
Cases, supra note 3 (describing the denial of Mickens' appeal for a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus).
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preparation of his habeas petition, new and startling information
came to light about his trial lawyer: the very same courtappointed trial attorney who represented the defendant had also
been representing the murder victim in a separate matter. 5 This
information was only revealed upon the inadvertent disclosure of
defendant's file to his habeas counsel.
The attorney's
representation of the victim included a personal meeting where
the two discussed the victim's own case. 6 The file also revealed
that the judge who had dismissed the criminal charges against
the victim, upon proof of his death, was the same judge who soon
thereafter assigned that victim's lawyer to the condemned man
and presided at his trial. 7 None of this information, which raised
serious questions of conflict of interest, was ever disclosed by
trial counsel to the condemned man. 8 Nor did trial counsel ever
object to his appointment to represent the man alleged to have
murdered the former client.9 Moreover, the trial judge, though
5 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 164 (explaining that federal habeas counsel
discovered that Mickens' lead trial attorney was representing Mickens' victim on assault
and concealed-weapons charges at the time of the murder); Mickens v. Greene, 74 F.
Supp. 2d at 599 (describing Mickens' contention that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel because his lead trial counsel represented Mickens' victim, Timothy Hall, at the
time of Hall's murder); Patrice McGuire Sabach, Note, Rethinking Unwaivable Conflicts
of Interest After U.S. v. Schwarz and Mickens v. Taylor, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRV. Am. L. 89,
114 (2003) (showing that Saunders had represented Hall in a criminal matter up until the
day of Hall's death).
6 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 164 (stating that Saunders had been appointed to
represent Hall on Mar. 20, 1992, and had met with him once for fifteen to thirty minutes
some time the following week); Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 599 (describing the
situation that brought about Hall's need for representation and noting professional
contact between Hall and Saunders); Kristen F. Grunewald, Note, United States Supreme
Court: Mickens v. Taylor, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 137, 137 (showing that after appointment to
represent Hall on assault and concealed-weapons charges, Saunders and Hall met once
for approximately fifteen to thirty minutes to discuss the case).
7 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 164 (describing Saunders' appointment to
represent Hall); Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 599-600 (highlighting sequence of
events involving counsel being relieved from his representation of Hall and subsequent
appointment to represent Mickens); Grunewald, supra note 6, at 137 (explaining that the
same juvenile court judge that appointed Saunders to represent Hall also appointed
Saunders to represent Mickens).
8 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 165 (noting that at the time of his appointment
Saunders did not disclose to the court, his co-counsel, or Mickens that he had previously
represented Hall); Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 600 (noting as an undisputed
issue the fact that Mickens was unaware of Saunders' representation of Hall until the
initiation of federal habeas corpus proceedings); Sabach, supra note 5, at 114 (showing
that Saunders never disclosed his representation of Hall to Mickens, his co-counsel, or the
court).
9 See Grunewald, supra note 6, at 137-38 (noting that Saunders accepted Mickens'
case without objection and did not inform Mickens or the court of his prior representation
of Hall); Sabach, supra note 5, at 114 (showing that Saunders never disclosed his
representation of Hall to Mickens, his co-counsel, or the court). See generally Mickens v.
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presumably aware the conflict existed through her prior
involvement in the victim's unrelated matter, never conducted
any inquiry into it.10
The man whose murder trial ultimately concluded with his
sentence to death was thus represented at that trial by a lawyer
who had previously represented his alleged victim-a lawyer who
had been assigned, no less, to this case by the same judge set to
hear the victim's own case. This all occurred in a matter in
which a life was at stake. Certainly, a breakdown in the justice
system of this magnitude should afford the condemned man some
measure of relief. These circumstances raise serious questions
about the fundamental fairness of his trial and sentencing. The
United States Supreme Court, however, characterized these
defects as harmless error. In Mickens v. Taylor,11 a sharply
divided Court held by a five-to-four majority that a trial judge's
failure to inquire into an unchallenged conflict of interest arising
from consecutive representation, although known or reasonably
foreseeable to the trial judge, is not grounds for overturning a
conviction unless the defendant demonstrates that the conflict
adversely affected the representation. 12
This paper argues that the Court's decision in Mickens
represents a misapplication of prior Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence and a missed opportunity to carve out a new and
Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 600 (describing the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of
charges against Hall as a result of his death and Saunders' subsequent appointment to
represent Mickens).
10 See Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 593 (asserting that Mickens "was denied
his.., right to the effective assistance of counsel when the trial judge of the Newport
News Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court failed to inform Petitioner of the conflict of
interest and inquire of the Petitioner whether he was aware of the conflict"); Grunewald,
supra note 6, at 138 (stating that the same court that appointed Saunders as counsel to
both Hall and Mickens did not independently inquire into the potential conflict); Sabach,
supra note 5, at 114 (showing that the trial court failed to inquire into the potential
conflict despite the fact that the same judge had dismissed the unrelated charges against
Hall three days before appointing Saunders to represent Mickens).
11 535 U.S. 162 (2002).
12 See id. at 173 (holding that the scenario presented in Mickens does not fit within
the contemplated exceptions to the general rule governing automatic reversal and
conflicted representation); Grunewald, supra note 6, at 139 (showing that the U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's denial of habeas relief, holding that even if a
trial court fails to inquire into a possible conflict of interest about which it knew or
reasonably should have known, a defendant still must show that the conflict adversely
affected his representation); Sabach, supra note 5, at 114 (stating that the Mickens
majority held that a theoretical conflict, one that was not shown to have adversely
affected defendant, was not sufficient to establish that defendant had been deprived of his
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel).
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necessary exception to the general rule governing ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. Part I provides a history of the
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Part II
describes the Court's relevant Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
over the three decades prior to Mickens. From these cases
emerges the modern doctrine governing ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.
In Part III, the Mickens decision will be
presented. Part IV will scrutinize and analyze Mickens within
the framework established by the Court's precedents. It will
demonstrate that Mickens is distinguishable in several critical
aspects from the earlier cases. Part IV will also present an
alternate approach to the Mickens' ineffective assistance of
counsel scenario that addresses the concerns expressed by both
the majority and dissenting Justices in Mickens. Finally, Part V
of this paper will turn to the future implications and impact of
this decision on criminal defendants and the court system.
I.

THE ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
established a framework for proceedings in a criminal trial.13 It
affords several substantive rights to those accused of a crime.1 4
Among these is a "right ...

to have the Assistance of Counsel for

his defence."15 From the time of ratification, it was recognized
that those accused of a crime had a right to retain private

13 The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
14 United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981) (stating that the Sixth
Amendment right of the accused to the assistance of counsel for his defense is meant to
assure fairness in the adversary criminal process); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300,
309 (1973) (explaining that the core purpose of the counsel guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment was to assure "assistance" at trial when the accused was confronted with
both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (stating that the Sixth Amendment "stands as a constant
admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not 'still be
done"').
15 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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counsel in federal court. 16 Gradually, the Supreme Court's Sixth
Amendment
decisions,1 7 together
with
its
Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence,' 8 applied the Sixth Amendment right
20
to counsel to state criminal cases, 19 including petty offenses.
This right, however, is not absolute. An accused has the right to
2
knowingly and voluntarily waive the assistance of counsel. 1
Furthermore, assistance of counsel is only constitutionally
required at the "critical stages" of criminal proceedings, and not
at every level of the process. 22 Apart from these limited
16 See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 308 (1930) (explaining that the modern
criminal defendant is provided with "the most complete opportunity for making his
defense," including the furnishing of counsel by the state); see also Johnson, 304 U.S. at
463 (discussing the history and purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of
counsel); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET. AL., CRIM. PROC. § 11.1(a) (3d ed. 2000) (indicating that
the Sixth Amendment always guaranteed a right to retain private counsel in defense).
17 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932) (calling the right to aid of counsel
"of... fundamental character"); see also Johnson, 304 U.S. at 467-68 (finding that
criminal defendants have a right to counsel and a right to waive such counsel in federal
court, but that such a waiver must be knowingly and intelligently made). See generally
LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 11.1(a) (offering a general overview of Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence as it relates to the right to counsel).
18 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ('No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
19 Compare Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942) (finding that while the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the specific guarantees
found in the Sixth Amendment, a denial by a State of rights or privileges specifically
embodied in the Sixth Amendment may, "in certain circumstances, or in connection with
other elements, operate, in a given case, to deprive a litigant of due process of law in
violation of the Fourteenth"), with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963)
(overruling Betts and recognizing that the right to counsel in all felony proceedings is
guaranteed at the state level). See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW § 4.02(b) (3d ed. 2001) (offering an overview of Fourteenth Amendment
limits on state governments).
20 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30 (1972) (holding that there is nothing in
the language of the Sixth Amendment, its history, or in the decisions of the Court
indicating that it was intended to embody a retraction of the right to counsel in petty
offenses); Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 225 (1980) (reiterating Court's previous
rejection of the suggestion that the right to counsel applies only to non-petty offenses
where the accused had a right to a jury trial). See generally James v. Headley, 410 F.2d
325, 331 n.9 (5th Cir. 1969) (explaining that there is nothing in the history of the Sixth
Amendment to suggest that the Framers of the Constitution intended to withdraw the
right to representation in cases involving lesser offenses in which it had existed at
common law).
21 See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 467-68 (asserting a right of accused to waive counsel if
done so knowingly and intelligently). See generally Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172
(2002) (noting that in the instance of actual conflict the judge can avoid all possibility of
reversal by suggesting that defendant waive counsel or by replacing the conflicted
attorney); Sabach, supra note 5, at 94 (noting that defendants are generally able to waive
the right to conflict-free counsel just as they are able to waive other constitutional rights,
so long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary).
22 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 172 (explaining that where assistance of counsel
has been denied during a critical stage of the proceeding the representation is assumed to
have failed to have met the constitutional mandate); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
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exceptions, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is absolute.
Any conviction obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment,
therefore, must be reversed-not subject to harmless error
23
review.
The Constitution also guarantees the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel to those unable to afford counsel. 24 These indigent
individuals are appointed counsel consistent with the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment. 2 5 However, the
assignment of counsel is not irrevocable. Upon a showing of good
cause, assigned counsel may be replaced by the court. 26 Good
cause includes instances where the defendant can show the
existence of a conflict of interest. 27 Such conflicts arise in several
circumstances: between attorney and judge, between attorney
648, 659 (1984) (stating that the presumption that counsel's assistance is essential
requires conclusion that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage
thereof); LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 11.2(b) (noting counsel is only constitutionally required
at the "critical stages" of a criminal proceeding, defined as those stages in which the
"substantial rights of the defendant may be affected").
23 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 172 (explaining that where assistance of counsel has
been denied entirely the representation is assumed to have failed to have met the
constitutional mandate); Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 (indicating that a denial of counsel is
tantamount to a presumed unfair trial); Johnson, 304 U.S. at 467-68 (calling compliance
with the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel mandate "an essential jurisdictional
prerequisite to a federal court's authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty").
24 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding that the right of an
indigent defendant in a criminal trial to assistance of counsel is a fundamental one
essential to a fair trial); LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 11.2(g) (discussing indigence standards
and appointment of counsel); Sabach, supra note 5, at 92 (noting that all defendants faced
with the prospect of criminal prosecution by the state are entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel regardless of ability to pay).
25 See generally Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 184 (explaining that when indigent
defendants are unable to retain lawyers, the trial judge's appointment of counsel becomes
a critical stage of a criminal trial); LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 11.2(b) (discussing the stages
in a criminal prosecution at which the Constitution guarantees the right to counsel);
Sabach, supra note 5, at 92 (outlining the constitutional guarantees implicit in the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel).
26 See LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 11.4(b) (discussing circumstances evidencing good
cause for replacement of counsel). People v. Russell, 656 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Mich. Ct. App.
2002) (noting that the trial court is the best judge of whether good cause exists to replace
appointed counsel); People v. Traylor, 628 N.W.2d 120, 122 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (stating
that a disagreement on how to handle fundamental trial tactics is sufficient cause to
replace counsel).
27 See LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 11.4(b) (recognizing that good cause arises in
circumstances "such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communications, or
an irreconcilable conflict which could lead to an apparently unjust verdict"). See generally
United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding good cause for
dismissal on conflict of interest grounds where court appointed defense counsel conceded
the defendant's guilt during closing argument); United States v. Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d
937, 940-41 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that because defendant's appointed counsel had
prosecuted him in an earlier conviction that led to the case at bar, good cause for
dismissal and replacement was evident).
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and client, or between multiple attorneys representing discrete
interests. 2 8 In an attorney-client conflict, a showing of good
cause will likely result in the granting of a motion for
replacement of counsel. 2 9 The replacement of counsel is generally
based upon a motion made before or during trial, 30 where a court
is able to address and resolve conflict of interest issues on a
prospective basis.
The effect for the defendant, however, is greatly altered when a
conflict is raised either post-trial, or has not been adequately
resolved upon a timely objection at trial. 3 1 The Supreme Court's
recent jurisprudence has focused specifically on instances of
retrospective claims that counsel was ineffective based upon a
conflict of interest. The situation confronted by the Mickens
Court involved such a retrospective claim. 32 However, a clear
understanding of the Court's approach to these types of claims is
a necessary predicate to exploring the 2002 decision.

28 See LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 11.9(a) (noting that a showing of good cause bolsters
a request for replacement counsel). See generally United States v. Vaquero, 997 F.2d 78,
89 (5th. Cir. 1993) (stating that a conflict of interest existed where counsel's defense of coconspirators may have been tainted by his own personal involvement in the conspiracy);
United States v. Swartz, 975 F.2d 1042, 1045-48 (4th Cir. 1992) (indicating a conflict of
interest where appointed counsel represented co-defendants and exploited less culpable
defendant to help more culpable defendant).
29 See LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 11.4(b) (indicating that there must be some "well
founded reason" for requesting replacement of counsel). See generally United States v.
Iles, 906 F.2d 1122, 1130 n.8 (6th. Cir. 1990) (articulating that in addition to a well
founded reason, the appellate courts also consider "the timeliness of the motion; the
adequacy of the court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint; and whether the conflict
between the attorney and client was so great that it resulted in a total lack of
communication preventing an adequate defense"); Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d at 940
(suggesting that an evident conflict of interest is good cause to request replacement
counsel).
30 See LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 11.4(b) (discussing replacement of counsel for good
cause). See generally United States v. Richardson, 894 F.2d 492, 496 (1st. Cir. 1991)
(denying motion for substitute counsel made on morning of trial); Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d
at 939 (moving for replacement of counsel before sentencing hearing).
31 Compare United States v. Hallock, 941 F.2d 36, 43-44 (1st Cir. 1991) (explaining
that a defendant's failure to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claim during trial is
problematic because the issue is not preserved in the record for review), with United
States v. Matos, 905 F.2d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that an appellate court may
review a fresh ineffective assistance of counsel claim if it is "in the interests of justice" to
do so). See generally Joe Margulies, Criminal Law: Resource Deprivation and the Right to
Counsel, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 673, 715 (1989) (noting that ineffective assistance
of counsel claims are generally raised after trial).
32 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002) (confronting a retrospective claim for
relief based on compromised counsel due to conflict of interest); see also Mickens v. Taylor,
240 F.3d 348, 363 (4th. Cir. 2001) (holding that the plaintiff must prove a causal link
between adverse affect and attorney conflict of interest).
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II. THE BURDEN OF RAISING A POST-CONVICTION INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM

Generally, a convicted defendant bears the burden of raising
and proving that a conflict of interest adversely affected his trial
attorney's performance, 33 and "that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."34 There are,
however, a few key exceptions to the general rule. Where a
defendant is denied
the assistance of counsel at one of the
"critical stages" 35 of a criminal proceeding, reversal is
automatic. 36 Likewise, in instances where representation is
forced upon the defendant over the timely objection of an
attorney, prejudice will be presumed and reversal of conviction is
mandatory. 37 Where a conflict of interest is known or reasonably
foreseeable to a trial court, prejudice is not presumed absent the
defendant's timely objection. Raising such a conflict post-trial,

33 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (requiring that plaintiff
raising claim of deficient performance of counsel show that the conflict had an adverse
effect on the representation); Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 363 (demanding a similar
standard); see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-49 (1980) (holding that a
defendant must demonstrate that conflict of interest materially affected the adequacy of
his counsel).
34 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (holding petitioner must show reasonable
probability that outcome would have differed absent conflict). See generally Jones v.
State, 8 S.W.3d 482, 489 (Ark. 2000) (denying rehearing based on Strickland standard);
Strickler v. Murray, 452 S.E.2d 648, 651-52 (Va. 1995) (explaining the Strickland
burden).
35 See LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 11.2(b) (indicating that the "critical stages" of a
criminal proceeding are defined as those stages in which the "substantial rights of the
defendant may be affected at the particular proceeding"). See generally Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961) (deeming arraignment a critical stage of a criminal
proceeding); Sigler v. Bird, 354 F.2d 694, 698 (8th. Cir. 1966) (holding that a preliminary
hearing may be a critical stage in a criminal proceeding).
36 See United States v, Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25 (1984) (stating that "the Court
has uniformly found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when counsel
was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage
of the proceeding"). See generally Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 53 (reversing based on
deprivation of adequate assistance of counsel at a critical stage of the proceeding); Sigler,
354 F.2d at 698 (reversing on grounds similar to those outlined in Cronic).
37 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978) (analyzing the proper standard
for reversal based on forced joint representation). But see State v. Bible, 459 P.2d 646, 648
(Wash. 1969) (denying reversal on potential prejudice grounds where defendant never
requested separate counsel). See generally State v. Kennedy, 508 P.2d 1386, 1389-90
(Wash. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that any evidence on the record that indicates a prejudicial
ineffective assistance of counsel is grounds for reversal).
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however, requires a reviewing court to conduct an inquiry which
38
might, in turn, mandate reversal.
This analysis will begin with a detailed examination of
Strickland v. Washington,3 9 the case that announced the general
rule, followed by the categorical exceptions to the Strickland rule
recognized prior to the 2002 holding in Mickens.
A. The Strickland Standard
Strickland v. Washington40 involved a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of a trial. 4 1 The
State of Florida brought charges against defendant David
Washington for several offenses following a ten day crime spree
in 1976.42 Against the advice of his court-appointed counsel,
Washington pled guilty to a charge for capital murder. 4 3 Also
against the advice of counsel, Washington waived the right to a
jury during the sentencing phase of his trial.44 Although the trial
judge expressed respect for Washington's acceptance of
responsibility, he made no representations as to the sentence he
would impose. 4 5 In his plea colloquy at the guilt phase,
Washington asserted that he did not have an extensive criminal
background, 4 6 a statement marred by inaccuracy. 4 7 Counsel,
38 See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272 (1981) (requiring lower courts to inquire
into possible conflicts on interest). See generally United States v. Akinseye, 802 F.2d 740,
744 (4th. Cir. 1986) (stating that a trial court may properly assume the absence of a
conflict caused by joint representation if a defendant makes no objection); United States v.
Ramsey, 661 F.2d 1013, 1018 (4th. Cir. 1981) (opining that only the "possibility of a
particular conflict" engages the court's duty to inquire into a potential conflict of interest).
39 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (inquiring into the appropriate
standard for effective assistance of counsel).
40 Id.
41 See id. at 675 (revealing that among the claims for relief brought by Washington
was one of ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his trial).
42 See id. at 671-72 (the charges against Washington included "three counts of firstdegree murder and multiple counts of robbery, kidnapping for ransom, breaking and
entering and assault, attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit robbery").
43 See id. at 672 (outlining counsel's plea strategy).
44 See id. (noting that respondent waived his right to a jury).
45 See id. (memorializing trial judge's statement that "he had 'a great deal of respect
for people who are willing to step forward and admit their responsibility' but that he was
making no statement at all about his likely sentencing decision.")
46 See id. Washington represented that "although he had committed a string of
burglaries, he had no significant prior criminal record and that at the time of his criminal
spree he was under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family. He also
stated ... that he accepted responsibility for the crimes." Id.
47 See id. at 673 (revealing that trial counsel successfully moved to suppress the
introduction of Washington's "rap sheet").
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intent on keeping any damaging evidence from surfacing, either
in the form of character evidence or by the production of
Washington's "rap sheet," chose not to have a presentence report
prepared, did not present any witnesses on Washington's behalf,
and did not call Washington to the stand at the sentencing
hearing.48 At that hearing, "the trial judge found that all three
murders were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel, all
involving repeated stabbings."49 Further, he noted that "[a]ll
three murders were committed in the course of at least one other
dangerous and violent felony, and since all involved robbery, the
murders were for pecuniary gain."5 0 The trial judge, having
concluded
that the
aggravating
circumstances
greatly
outweighed the lone mitigating factor of Washington's acceptance
of responsibility, sentenced Washington to death.51
Washington then challenged the sentence collaterally in state
court, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for
relief. 52 The trial court, however, found the claim lacked merit,
and without holding a hearing, denied relief.5 3 The Florida
48 See id. at 672-73 (detailing counsel's trial strategy).
49 Id. at 674.
50 Id.
51 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 675 (1984) (reporting imposition of
death sentence); see also Alexandra N. DeNeve, Beets v. Scott: The Fifth Circuit Adopts
the Strickland Test to Deal with Ineffective Assistance Claims That Arise from Conflicts of
Interest That Do Not Involve Multiple- or Serial-Client Representation, 70 TUL. L. REV.
1689, 1695 (1996) (noting trial judge's sentence of death for defendant); Richard P.
Rhodes, Jr., Note, Strickland v. Washington: Safeguard of the Capital Defendant's Right
to Assistance of Counsel?, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 121, 136 (1992) (reviewing
Washington's death penalty sentence).
52 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 675 (examining ineffective assistance challenge by
defendant); see also DeNeve, supra note 51, at 1695 (noting challenge to sentence based
on ineffective counsel claim); Rhodes, supra note 51, at 136 (stating defendant's
ineffective counsel challenge). Specifically, Washington claimed:
that counsel had rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing proceeding.
Respondent challenged counsel's assistance in six respects. He asserted that counsel
was ineffective because he failed to move for a continuance to prepare for sentencing,
to request a psychiatric report, to investigate and present character witnesses, to seek
a presentence investigation report, to present meaningful arguments to the
sentencing judge, and to investigate the medical examiner's reports or cross-examine
the medical experts. In support of the claim, respondent submitted 14 affidavits from
friends, neighbors, and relatives stating that they would have testified if asked to do
so. He also submitted one psychiatric report and one psychological report stating that
respondent, though not under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance, was "chronically frustrated and depressed because of his economic
dilemma" at the time of his crimes.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 675-76.
53 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 676 (reciting collateral relief attempt by convicted
defendant); Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285, 286 (Fla. 1981) (noting that defendant
filed motion in trial court for post-conviction relief); see also Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-
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Supreme Court affirmed. 5 4 Washington then sought federal
habeas corpus relief on the same grounds rejected by the state
courts. 55 However, the District Court, agreeing with the findings
56
and rationale of the state courts, denied relief.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reversed, 5 7 and in doing so, articulated specific standards and
created a framework for resolving ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in that circuit.58 As an initial threshold to relief,
the court found that "the [habeas] petitioner has the burden of
persuasion to demonstrate that the ineffective assistance created
not only 'a possibility of prejudice, but that it worked to his
actual and substantial disadvantage."' 5 9 Upon satisfaction of that
burden, "the habeas corpus writ must be granted unless the state
proves that counsel's ineffectiveness was harmless beyond a
Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A System in Need of Reform, 2002 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 14 (2002) (reviewing collateral appeal by Washington in state court).
54 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 678 (noting that "the State Supreme Court concluded
that respondent had failed to make out a prima facie case of either 'substantial deficiency
or possible prejudice"'); Washington, 397 So. 2d at 287 (affirming trial court on appeal);
see also Duncan, supra note 53, at 14 (describing state court's denial of relief).
55 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 678 (noting Washington filed writ of habeas corpus
relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida); see also
Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 1982), rev'd by Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (denoting Washington's habeas corpus relief attempt in
federal court); Duncan, supra note 53, at 14 (reviewing Washington's habeas relief filing
in federal court).
56 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 678. Referring to the district court's denial of relief),
the Court, in summarizing the District Court findings, noted the following:
On the legal issue of ineffectiveness, the District Court concluded that, although trial
counsel made errors in judgment in failing to investigate nonstatutory mitigating
evidence further than he did, no prejudice to respondent's sentence resulted from any
such error in judgment. Relying in part on the trial judge's testimony but also on the
same factors that led the state courts to find no prejudice, the District Court
concluded that "there does not appear to be a likelihood, or even a significant
possibility," that any errors of trial counsel had affected the outcome of the
sentencing proceeding.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 678-79.
57 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 679. The route to reversal, however, was unique:
On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions to apply to the
particular facts the framework for analyzing ineffectiveness claims that it developed
in its opinion. The panel decision was itself vacated when Unit B of the former Fifth
Circuit, now the Eleventh Circuit, decided to rehear the case en banc. The full Court
of Appeals ...reversed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case for
new fact-finding under the newly announced standards.
Strickland,466 U.S. at 679.
58 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 679 (noting Eleventh Circuit's imposition of new
standard); Washington, 693 F.2d at 1252 (proposing guidelines for district courts dealing
with ineffective assistance cases); see also Duncan, supra note 53, at 16 n.82 (explaining
"Eleventh Circuit's newly announced standard of evaluation for ineffectiveness claims").
59 Washington, 693 F.2d at 1258.
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reasonable doubt."60 The Eleventh Circuit rejected a test that
was being applied by other Circuits at that time which called for
a showing by the defendant that the outcome would have been
different had counsel provided more adequate assistance. 6 1
Having announced its own test, the Eleventh Circuit remanded
the case for further proceedings and factual determinations by
the District Court. 6 2
The United States Supreme Court granted Florida's petition
for certiorari to consider the test established by the Eleventh
Circuit. 63 In reversing, the Court articulated a two-part test for
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, predicated upon proof
that the performance of counsel was substandard and that the
substandard performance prejudiced the defense.64 Specifically,
the Court stated:
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so

defective as to require reversal.., has two components. First, the
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 65
60 Id.
61 See Washington, 693 F.2d at 1262 (rejecting outcome-determinative approach); cf.
United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (outlining outcomedeterminative test for inadequate counsel cases). See generally Boykins v. Wainwright,
737 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir. 1984) (questioning validity of Decoster outcome
determinative test after Supreme Court decision in Strickland v. Washington).
62 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 679 (noting Eleventh Circuit's remand of case);
Washington, 693 F.2d at 1263 (remanding case to trial court for new factual
determinations); see also Duncan, supra note 53, at 15 (reporting remand of case by
Eleventh Circuit).
63 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 671 (indicating issue on appeal was the proper method for
determining when a sentence may be set aside under a contention of ineffective assistance
of counsel); see Duncan, supra note 53, at 15 (observing Supreme Court granted
certiorari); Richard L. Gabriel, Comment, The Strickland Standard for Claims of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due
Process, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1259, 1264-65 (1986) (noting certiorari was granted to
consider legal standard in ineffective assistance cases).
64 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (articulating basis for decision within new
standard); see also Ivan K. Fong, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital
Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 461, 468 (1987) (articulating the Court's new standard for
dealing with these cases); Gabriel, supra note 63, at 1265 (enunciating the Court's twopart test).
65 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
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As to the first prong of the test, the Court recognized that
"[tihe purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to
ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify
reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." 66 As to its second
prong, the Court reasoned that "[e]ven if a defendant shows that
particular errors of counsel were unreasonable,... the defendant
must show that they actually had an adverse effect on the
defense." 67 This requires that "[t]he defendant.., show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." 68 Ultimately, "[u]nless a defendant makes both
showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders
69
the result unreliable."
70
The Court then proceeded to apply its newly announced test.
First, the Court found that Washington's counsel had not
performed ineffectively.71 The Court concluded that the decisions
made at the sentencing phase of the trial were not unreasonable
under the circumstances 72 and found that "nothing in the record
indicates ... that counsel's sense of hopelessness distorted his
professional judgment."7 3 Also, the Court reasoned that
"[c]ounsel's strategy choice was well within the range of
professionally reasonable judgments, and the decision not to seek
more character or psychological evidence than was already in
66 Id. at 691-92.
67 Id. at 693.
68 Id. at 694.
69 Id. at 687.
70 See id. at 698 (applying new standard); see also Fong, supra note 64, at 470
(explaining application of standard set forth in Strickland); see generally Gabriel, supra
note 63, at 1266 (describing the Court's application of its new rule to the case at hand).
71 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698 (finding conduct of counsel reasonable); see also
David J. Gross, Supreme Court Review: Sixth Amendment - Defendant's Dual Burden in
Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Strickland v. Washington, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 755, 765 (1984) (describing Court's holding that "counsel's conduct was
reasonable"). See generally James W. Hitzeman, Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel:
Strickland and the Illinois Death Penalty Statute, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 131, 140 (1987)
(describing the first prong of the test announced in Strickland).
72 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672-73 and 698-99 (examining attorney's conduct,
including the choice not to request a pre-sentence report, the choice not to present
witnesses on Washington's behalf, and the choice not to call Washington himself to the
stand); see also Gross, supra note 71, at 765 (describing conduct of attorney in case to
show that it was not unreasonable). See generally Hitzeman, supra note 71, at 140 (noting
that defendant must show errors "so serious that counsel did not perform as the 'counsel'
which the Sixth amendment guarantees").
73 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699.
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hand was likewise reasonable." 74 The Court further reasoned
that on the facts presented, even had ineffectiveness been shown,
there was no basis to conclude that counsel's assistance had
resulted in prejudice. 75 Specifically, the Court stated:
With respect to the prejudice component, the lack of merit of
respondent's claim is even more stark. The evidence that respondent
says his trial counsel should have offered at the sentencing hearing
would barely have altered the sentencing profile presented to the
sentencing judge.... Given the overwhelming aggravating factors,
there is no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would
have changed the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances and, hence, the sentence
imposed. Indeed, admission of the evidence respondent now offers
might even have been harmful to his case: his "rap sheet" would
probably have been admitted into evidence, and the psychological
reports would have directly contradicted respondent's claim that the
mitigating circumstance of extreme emotional disturbance applied to
his case. 76

For those reasons, the Court reversed and denied Washington's
claim for a writ of habeas corpus relief.7 7 Strickland thus
established a uniform framework for addressing post-conviction
ineffective assistance of counsel claims for relief.

74 Id. Specifically, the Court noted:
The trial judge's views on the importance of owning up to one's crimes were well
known to counsel. The aggravating circumstances were utterly overwhelming. Trial
counsel could reasonably surmise from his conversations with respondent that
character and psychological evidence would be of little help. . . . Restricting
testimony on respondent's character to what had come in at the plea colloquy ensured
that contrary character and psychological evidence and respondent's criminal history,
which counsel had successfully moved to exclude, would not come in. On these facts,
there can be little question, even without application of the presumption of adequate
performance, that trial counsel's defense, though unsuccessful, was the result of
reasonable professional judgment.
Id.
75 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698-99 (stating lack of basis for finding of prejudice);
see also Gross, supra note 71, at 765 (considering standard for sufficient prejudice). See
generally Hitzeman, supra note 71, at 140 (explaining that in order to establish necessary
level of prejudice, the defendant must show that he or she was deprived of a fair trial as
result of counsel's conduct).
76 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699-700.
77 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 701 (holding that the District Court properly declined
to issue the writ of habeas corpus); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 519 (2003)
(detailing the proper standard for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus). See generally
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 21 (2002) (indicating the proper standard of review for
habeas corpus relief).
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The Exceptions to the Strickland Rule

The Court has since recognized a limited number of exceptions
78
to the rule announced in Strickland. Holloway v. Arkansas,
Cuyler v. Sullivan,7 9 and Wood v. Georgia80 are the principle
decisions establishing these exceptions.
1. Holloway v. Arkansas
In Holloway v. Arkansas,8 1 three men were arrested and
charged with one count of robbery and two counts of rape,
stemming from occurrences at a Little Rock restaurant.8 2 In June
1975, the three men entered the restaurant in the early morning
hours, robbed it at gunpoint and raped two of the female
employees-one of them multiple times. 8 3 After their arrest, a
single public defender was assigned by the court to represent all
three defendants. 84 Following not guilty pleas at the
arraignment, a consolidated trial was set for all three
defendants.8 5 The public defender, in order to avoid a potential
conflict of interest, moved for appointment of separate counsel
"because 'the defendants [had] stated to him that there is a

78 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978) (establishing that requests for appointment of separate
counsel based on representations regarding conflicts of interests should be granted).
79 446 U.S. 335, 353 (1980) (holding that lawyers forced to represent codefendants
whose interests conflict cannot provide adequate legal assistance).
80 450 U.S. 261, 273-74 (1981) (indicating that it is inherently wrong for an attorney
who represents an employee to accept a promise to pay from one whose criminal liability
may turn on the employee's testimony).
81 435 U.S. at 490-91 (asserting that assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment should not be impaired by court orders requiring one lawyer to
simultaneously represent conflicting interests).
82 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 477 (detailing the outcome of the criminal
trial); see also Holloway v. State, 539 S.W.2d 435, 436 (Ark. 1976) (indicating the facts
leading to conviction). See generally Holloway v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 252, 253 (8th Cir.
1985) (noting the facts of the underlying action).
83 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 477 (indicating the details of the criminal
act); see also Holloway v. State, 539 S.W.2d at 436 (noting the details of the offense). See
generally Lockhart, 754 F.2d at 253 (detailing the facts leading to conviction).
84 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 477 (noting the assignment of counsel); see
also Holloway v. State, 539 S.W.2d at 436 (indicating the assignment of counsel). See
generally Lockhart, 754 F.2d at 253 (detailing the assignment of counsel).
85 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 477 (detailing the procedural posture of the
matter); see also Holloway v. State, 539 S.W.2d at 436 (noting the use of a consolidated
trial). See generally Lockhart, 754 F.2d at 253 (indicating the facts leading to conviction).
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possibility of a conflict of interest in each of their cases."' 86 This
motion to appoint separate counsel was denied.87
Following this denial, and prior to trial, one of the defendants
successfully moved to allow the introduction of a statement he
made to officers at the time of his arrest in which he denied
participation in the rapes.S8 On the day set for trial, before a jury
had been selected and empanelled, defense counsel again
requested a severance. This time, counsel moved "on the grounds
that one or two of the defendants may testify and... I will not be
able to cross-examine them because I have received confidential
information from them."8 9 Again, the motion was denied.90
After the prosecution presented its direct case, the court was
notified that the three defendants would each take the stand
against the advice of defense counsel. 9 i For a third time, counsel
raised an objection to his continued concurrent representation of
all three defendants. 92 The trial judge stated: "That's all right; let
them testify. There is no conflict of interest," and denied the
objection. 9 3 All three defendants were subsequently convicted by

the jury on all counts. 94

86 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 477.
87 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 477 (reviewing denial of motions to appoint
separate counsel); see also Holloway v. State, 539 S.W.2d at 437 (indicating the denial of
request to appoint separate counsel). See generally Lockhart, 754 F.2d at 253 (noting the
denial of appointment of separate counsel).
88 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 477-78 (determining admissibility of
redacted version of confession after conducting evidentiary hearing pursuant to Jackson
v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)); see also Holloway v. State, 539 S.W.2d at 437 (noting the
admission of the statement). See generally Lockhart, 754 F.2d at 253 (detailing the
admission of the statement).
89 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 478.
90 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 478 (noting the denial of the motion); see
also Holloway v. State, 539 S.W.2d at 436 (indicating the denial of the motion). See
generally Lockhart, 754 F.2d at 253 (detailing the denial of the motion).
91 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 478 (detailing the defendants' testimony
against advice of counsel); see also Holloway v. State, 539 S.W.2d at 436 (noting the
defendants' testimony). See generally Lockhart, 754 F.2d at 253 (indicating the
defendants' testimony).
92 Counsel objected by stating: "Now, since I have been appointed, I had previously
filed a motion asking the Court to appoint a separate attorney for each defendant because
of a possible conflict of interest. This conflict will probably be now coming up since each
one of them wants to testify." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 478.
93 The following exchange then took place:
[MR. HALL]: I am in a position now where I am more or less muzzled as to any crossexamination.
THE COURT: You have no right to cross-examine your own witness.
MR. HALL: Or to examine them.
THE COURT: You have a right to examine them, but have no right to cross-examine
them. The prosecuting attorney does that.
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On appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, the defendants
alleged that the trial court's denial of counsel's motions to
appoint separate counsel violated the defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel.9 5 However,
upon examining the record, the State Supreme Court affirmed all
three convictions finding that no actual conflict had occurred
since the testimony given by the codefendants had not
6
incriminated any of the others. 9
The United States Supreme Court granted defendants' petition
for certiorari to consider whether requiring a single attorney to
represent all three men, notwithstanding a timely objection by
defense counsel, violated their right to effective assistance of
counsel. The Court found that "trial counsel, by the pretrial
motions... and by his accompanying representations.., focused
97
explicitly on the probable risk of a conflict of interests."
Despite this, "[t]he judge ... failed either to appoint separate
counsel or to take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk

MR. HALL: If one [defendant] takes the stand, somebody needs to protect the other
two's interest while that one is testifying, and I can't do that since I have talked to
each one individually.
THE COURT: Well, you have talked to them, I assume, individually and collectively,
too. They all say they want to testify. I think it's perfectly alright [sic] for them to
testify if they want to, or not. It's their business.
[THE COURT]: Each defendant said he wants to testify, and there will be no crossexamination of these witnesses, just a direct examination by you.
MR. HALL: Your Honor, I can't even put them on direct examination because if I ask
themTHE COURT: (Interposing) You can just put them on the stand and tell the Court
that you have advised them of their rights and they want to testify; then you tell the
man to go ahead and relate what he wants to. That's all you need to do.
[DEFENDANT HOLLOWAY]: Your Honor, are we allowed to make an objection?
THE COURT: No, sir. Your counsel will take care of any objections.
MR. HALL: Your Honor, that is what I am trying to say. I can't cross-examine them.
THE COURT: You proceed like I tell you to, Mr. Hall. You have no right to crossexamine your own witnesses anyhow.
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 479-80.
94 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 481 (noting jury's return of guilty verdicts
on all counts); see also Holloway v. State, 539 S.W.2d at 436 (noting the convictions). See
generally Lockhart, 754 F.2d at 253 (detailing the convictions).
95 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 481 (indicating the basis for appeal); see also
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 519 (2003) (detailing this potential basis for appeal). See
generally Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002) (noting this avenue for appeal).
96 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 481 (indicating the lower court's position);
see also Holloway v. State, 539 S.W.2d at 436 (affirming the convictions because no actual
conflict occurred). See generally Lockhart, 754 F.2d at 253 (detailing the prior position of
the lower court).
97 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 484.
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was too remote to warrant separate counsel." 98 In reversing, the
Court held "that the failure, in the face of the representations
made by counsel weeks before trial and again before the jury was
empanelled, deprived petitioners of the guarantee of 'assistance
of counsel."' 9 9 Further, the Court noted that, "[t]he mere physical
presence of an attorney does not fulfill the Sixth Amendment
guarantee when the advocate's conflicting obligations have
effectively sealed his lips on crucial matters."10 0
The Holloway rationale was grounded in the Court's 1942
holding in Glasser v. United States.101 There, two of five codefendants who were initially represented by separate counsel
became represented by the same attorney.102 In Glasser, the
conflicted attorney was appointed by the District Court judge to
jointly represent the two co-defendants following the dismissal of
one party's counsel despite his timely objection.1 0 3 As a result,
counsel's ability to cross examine witnesses and make objections
was restricted.104 Although the Glasser Court found that joint
representation of co-defendants was not a per se Sixth
Amendment violation,105 it noted that "[o]f equal importance
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 490.
101 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (reversing conviction of one petitioner because appointment of
his attorney to represent second petitioner, co-defendant, lead to ineffective assistance of
counsel); see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 481 (noting Glasser's holding that
requiring an attorney to represent two co-defendants with conflicting interests violated
one defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel). See generally
Norman K. Thompson & Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Attorney-Client Privilge: Practical
MilitaryApplications of a Professional Core Value, 49 A.F. L. REV. 1, 36 (2000) (noting the
Supreme Court's holding that assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
"contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired").
102 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 481-82 (discussing facts of Glasser); see
also Glasser, 315 U.S. at 67 (reviewing discussion at trial which lead to defendants being
represented by same attorney). See generally Michael E. Lubowitz, Note, The Right to
Counsel of Choice After Wheat v. United States: Whose Choice is it?, 39 AM. U. L. REV.
437, 450 (1990) (noting defendant's right to conflict-free representation).
103 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 482 (stating attorney was dismissed
because of client dissatisfaction); see also Glasser, 315 U.S. at 68 (noting attorney told
court client no longer wanted to be represented by him). See generally Lubowitz, supra
note 102, at 450 (discussing history of right to counsel).
104 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 482 (stating attorney failed to cross
examine government witness who linked Glasser with conspiracy); see also Glasser, 315
U.S. at 73 (stating a thorough cross examination would have been advantageous). See
generally Lubowitz, supra note 102, at 550 (discussing factors considered in determining
conflict).
105 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 482 (noting court declined to inquire into
whether prejudice was harmless); see also Glasser, 315 U.S. at 76 (stating calculating
precise degree of prejudice is unnecessary). See generally, Lubowitz, supra note 102, at
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with the duty of the court to see that an accused has the
assistance of counsel is its duty to refrain from ... insisting...
that counsel undertake to concurrently represent interests which
might diverge... when the possibility of that divergence is
brought home to the court."106 In concluding its analysis, the
Holloway Court stated that Glasser is to be read "as holding that
whenever a trial court improperly requires joint representation
over timely objection reversal is automatic." 10 7 Thus, Holloway,
through Glasser, carves out an exception to Strickland where a
court requires multiple concurrent representation over an
attorney's timely and proper objection by making the reversal of
the resulting conviction mandatory. 0 8
2. Cuyler v. Sullivan
In Cuyler v. Sullivan,10 9 John Sullivan and two others were
charged with the first degree murders of a local labor official and
his companion.110 In the proceedings that followed, all three
defendants were represented by two privately retained
attorneys."'l No objection was raised to the multiple
representation at any time by any of the defendants or their

550 (noting trial judge does not have right to force an attorney to represent divergent
interests).
106 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 485 (quoting Glasser,315 U.S. at 76).
107 Id. at 488 (interpreting holding of Glasser).
108 See id. at 488 (holding that whenever a trial court improperly requires joint
representation over timely objection, reversal is automatic); see also Glasser, 315 U.S. at
70 (declaring trial court's refusal to assign counsel constitutes a violation of due process
under Fourteenth Amendment); cf. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002)
(discussing facts of Holloway).
109 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (finding trial court was not required to inquire into sufficiency
of multiple representation where no parties objected); see also Commonwealth v. Sullivan,
"Sullivan" 286 A.2d 898, 899 (Pa. 1971) (stating officer of Local Union was charged with
murder of two Union members). See generally Thompson & Kastenberg supra, note 101,
at 36 (stating Cuyler stands for proposition that potential for conflicted counsel gives rise
to a Sixth Amendment violation).
110 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 337 (reviewing facts of case); see also United States ex. rel
Sullivan v. Cuyler, "ex. rel Sullivan v. Cuyler" 593 F.2d 512, 515 (3d. Cir. 1979) (noting
conviction of two counts of first degree murder); Sullivan, 286 A.2d at 899 (noting charges
were based solely on circumstantial evidence).
111 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 338 (stating although Sullivan had different
representation for medical examiner's inquest, same two private attorneys represented
him throughout other state court proceedings); see also ex rel Sullivan, 593 F.2d at 515
(noting two attorney's entered appearances on behalf of each of three defendants);
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, "Commonwealth" 371 A.2d. 468, 483 (Pa. 1977) (stating
though tried separately, same attorneys were used by all three defendants).
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attorneys.112 Sullivan, the first to be tried, was convicted as
charged and sentenced to life in prison.113 In his trial, the
evidence presented by the state was largely circumstantial,
adduced chiefly from the testimony of a janitor employed at the
premises where the homicides took place.114 Sullivan never took
the stand, as the defense chose not to present a case. 115 At the
subsequent separate trials of Sullivan's co-defendants, each was
acquitted.1 16 On direct appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
affirmed Sullivan's conviction. 11 7
Sullivan
then
sought
collateral relief pursuant
to
Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Hearing Act,118 claiming, inter
alia, ineffective assistance of counsel.1l 9 In the hearings that
112 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 337-38 (noting Sullivan could not afford his own attorney);
ex rel Sullivan, 593 F.2d at 515 (noting the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania consolidated
three different appeals and ruled against ineffective assistance claim); see also
Commonwealth, 371 A.2d at 483 (finding no ineffective assistance).
113 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 338 (recognizing evidence was completely circumstantial,
existing mainly of one witness's testimony); ex rel Sullivan, 593 F.2d at 515 (stating trial
lasted two weeks ending in jury conviction for life imprisonment); see also
Commonwealth, 371 A.2d at 479 (stating jury found him guilty of two counts of first
degree murder).
114 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 338 (restating facts of case); ex rel Sullivan, 593 F.2d at
516 (reviewing janitor's testimony that he heard "sounds like firecrackers");
Commonwealth, 286 A.2d at 899-900 (summarizing testimony of janitor).
115 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 338 (stating one attorney later claimed he encouraged
Sullivan to take stand); ex rel Sullivan, 593 F.2d at 517 (stating Sullivan did not take
stand and no evidence was presented); Sullivan, 286 A.2d at 899-900 (stating Sullivan
did not take stand). See generally Commonwealth, 371 A.2d at 483 (discussing reasons for
claiming ineffective assistance).
116 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 338 (stating co-defendants were acquitted); Sullivan, 286
A.2d at 900 n.2 (stating that DiPasquale was acquitted when Commonwealth could not
produce its main witness and that Carchidi was also acquitted). See generally
Commonwealth, 371 A.2d at 483 (explaining reasons why no ineffective assistance was
proven).
117 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 338 (noting conviction was affirmed by an equally divided
vote); Sullivan, 286 A.2d at 899 (stating court was equally divided); see also
Commonwealth, 371 A.2d at 483 (finding in this second appeal defendant did not prove
dual representation in true sense of word).
118 See PA. STAT. ANN ., tit. 19, § 1180-1 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); see also
Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 338 (stating collateral relief was subsequently sought);
Commonwealth, 371 A.2d at 483 (noting appellant's first claim for collateral relief was
"that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel because his attorneys also
represented two co-defendants who were tried separately for the crime").
119 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 338. Post conviction relief was sought on five grounds,
including one for ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 339. The court reviewing the
claim for collateral relief pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act
stated that to determine ineffective assistance based on dual representation, it needed to
establish: 1) there was dual representation, and 2) as a result, a conflict of interest
resulted. Commonwealth, 371 A.2d at 483. Also related to the ineffective assistance claim
is the attorney-client privilege, and the fifth amendment right against self
incrimination-applicable here because Sullivan was being charged for the same crime as
other two defendants. See Thompson & Kastenberg, supra note 101, at 36.
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followed, testimony was given by several individuals including
Sullivan and the two trial attorneys.120 In substance, the trial
attorneys testified to differing accounts of their roles at the
trial.121 One of the attorneys maintained that the two acted as
co-counsel for each co-defendant, while the other claimed that
one acted as lead counsel for Sullivan and the other acted in that
capacity for each of the other co-defendants.1 22 Sullivan testified
that he relied on the advice given by both the attorneys not to
testify.12 3 Relief was ultimately denied.124 In that denial, the
court found no conflict of interest, holding that each attorney
maintained separate roles for Sullivan and his codefendants.
Furthermore, the court found that counsel had fully informed
Sullivan about the consequences of the decision not to take the
stand.12 5 Subsequently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
26
affirmed the denial of all direct and collateral relief.1
120 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 338 (stating differing opinions of two attorneys);
Commonwealth, 371 A.2d at 475 (stating that to determine validity of ineffective
assistance claim, it "often will be necessary to call counsel whose assistance is challenged
as ineffective so he may explain the decisions he made in the course of the appeal"). See
generally Jeffrey Levinson, Note, Don't Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard
for Effective Assistance of Counsel 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 147 (2001) (discussing
United States renewed concern with rights of individuals convicted of crimes).
121 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 338-39 (stating two attorneys gave conflicting accounts);
Commonwealth, 371 A.2d at 475 (noting the PCHA court found "considerable confusion
between counsel concerning the appeal due to Judge DiBona's appointment to the bench
and Mr. Peruto's heavy trial schedule"). See generally Levinson, supra note 120, at 147-48
(discussing specific case of death row inmate who received inadequate assistance of
counsel).
122 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 338-39 (stating Peruto recalled he had been chief counsel
for Carchidi and DePasquale, but only assisted DiBona in Sullivan's trial);
Commonwealth, 371 A.2d at 483 (stating DiBona was primarily devoted to Sullivan, and
played very minor role in other defendants' trials). See generally Levinson, surpa note
120, at 151 (recognizing Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause as Constitutional
sources for right to effective assistance).
123 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 339 (noting other evidence suggests Sullivan's decision not
to take stand was for fear of cross-examination revealing an extramarital affair);
Commonwealth, 371 A.2d at 483 (reviewing PCHA record and ultimately holding
defendant's claims insufficient). See generally Levinson, supra note 120, at 149 (stating
ineffective assistance is primarily a poverty problem).
124 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 339 (noting that after court allowed a second direct appeal
because counsel had acted ineffectively in Sullivan's first direct appeal, relief sought was
denied); Commonwealth, 371 A.2d at 483 (finding course of conduct by prior attorney
could not be deemed unreasonable). See generally Levinson, supra note 120, at 169
(reiterating idea that failure to provide effective assistance could "constitute an
independent due process violation, with or without prejudice to the defendant")
125 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 339 (stating there was no dual representation in true
sense of term); Commonwealth, 371 A.2d at 483 (stating Sullivan was informed). See
generally Levinson, supra note 120, at 169 (discussing analysis used in determining
ineffective assistance).
126 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 339 (finding no basis for Sullivan's claim that he had been
denied effective counsel at trial); see also United States ex. rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593
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After these unsuccessful claims for post-conviction relief in the
Pennsylvania State Courts, 12 7 Sullivan filed for federal habeas
corpus relief in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 12 8 That
petition was rejected for the same reason given in state court, on
a finding that Sullivan was not subjected to multiple
representation. 129 Additionally, the District Court held that even
if multiple representation was assumed to have occurred, based
upon the findings of fact at the state post-conviction hearings, it
did not constitute a conflict of interest. 130
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed. 1 3 1 Initially, the court noted that the representation
Sullivan and his co-defendants received was, as a matter of law,
multiple and concurrent. 132 But, the court continued,
F.2d 512, 521 (3d. Cir. 1979) (explaining view that reversal was warranted in that there
was possibility of prejudice or conflict of interest); Commonwealth, 371 A.2d at 483
(claiming there was no dual representation).
127 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 338-39 (stating that collateral relief was denied); see also
Commonwealth, 371 A.2d at 483 (denying post conviction relief after finding evidence
presented at trial sufficient to sustain conviction of murder in first degree); see generally
Maureen R. Green, Comment, A Coherent Approach to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1516, 1530 (1983) (discussing why the Court denied postconviction relief on conflict of interest claim).
128 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 339 (stating Sullivan sought habeas corpus after having
exhausted his state court remedies); see generally 42 PA. CODE § 741 (2003) (explaining
when Pennsylvania courts have power to issue writs of habeas corpus).
129 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 339 (finding no multiple representation); see also Nathan
M. Crystal, Ethics 2000 and Beyond: Reform or Professional Responsibility as Usual?:
False Testimony by Criminal Defendants: Still Unanswered Ethical and Constitutional
Questions, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1529, 1563-64 (2003) (stating that Cuyler v. Sullivan does
not suggest that all multiple representations result in conflict rendering the
representation unconstitutional); Helane L. Morrison, Note, Maxwell v. Superior Court:
Buying Counsel of Choice or Ineffective Assistance?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1348, 1366-67
(1983) (stating that Sullivan v. Cuyler offers definition for "actual and potential conflicts"
that shows how terms are often used in multiple representation cases).
130 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 340 (claiming "evidence adduced in the state
postconviction proceeding revealed no conflict of interest"); see also Robert Burrell,
USALSA Report, The Advocates for Military Defense Counsel: Effective Assistance of
Counsel: Conflicts of Interests and Pretrial Duty to Investigate, 1986 ARMY LAW. 39, 39
(1986) (showing that multiple representation is not "per se violative" of sixth amendment
and that there must be some evidence of active representation of conflicting interests);
John Capone, Supreme Court Review: FacilitatingFairness:The Judge's Role in the Sixth
Amendment Right to Effective Counsel, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 881, 885 (2003)
(discussing Cuyler v. Sullivan and what is necessary to demonstrate violation of Sixth
Amendment).
131 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 340 (reversing Court of Appeals); see also Edward L.
Wilkinson, Conflicts of Interest in Texas Criminal Cases, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 171, 206-07
(2002) (explaining how Court ruled); Lubowitz, supra note 102, at 451-52 (discussing
rationale behind Supreme Court holding).
132 See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 340 (establishing that same two lawyers represented all
three defendants); see also G. Paul McCormick, Feature, Supreme Court Review, 26
CHAMPION 26, 28-29 (2002) (discussing how three defendants in Cuyler v. Sullivan were
represented by same counsel, yet tried separately). See generally Joel Skinner, Note and
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[a] finding of dual representation does not, without more, require
reversal.... [Representation] of codefendants by the same attorney is
not tantamount to the denial of effective assistance of counsel
guaranteed by the sixth amendment. There must be some showing of a
possible conflict of interest or prejudice, however remote, before a
reviewing court will find the dual representation constitutionally
defective. 133
The court was also concerned that "it is often difficult or
impossible to determine [after the fact] whether a defendant has
been prejudiced by dual representation." 134 Thus, "a state
conviction cannot stand when an examination of the record
reveals that representation by independent counsel 'might have
made a difference in defense strategy."'135 Having concluded from
an examination of the record that it was possible that
representation by independent counsel would have produced a
different strategy, 136 the Third Circuit held that reversal of
conviction is mandatory when the criminal defendant makes
"some showing of a possible conflict of interest or prejudice,
however remote." 13 7
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court distinguished the
circumstances in Sullivan from those in Holloway and created
another hurdle to sustaining a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The Court noted that:
Holloway requires state trial courts to investigate timely objections to
multiple representation. But nothing in our precedents suggests that
Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Illinois: 'The Guiding Hand of Counsel"?, 59
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 901, 922 (1983) (noting that Court has held that no distinction should
be drawn between retained and appointed counsel in determining ineffectiveness).
133 United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512, 519 (3d Cir. 1979)
(quotations omitted).
134 Id. at 520.
135 Id. at 520-21 (quoting United States ex rel. Horta v. DeYoung, 523 F.2d 807, 809
(3d Cir. 1975) (per curium)).
136 See id. at 520 (indicating that dual-representation curtails ability for attorney to
fully represent his client in such areas as entering into plea bargain agreement where
testimony would be offered in exchange for reduced penalty, offering evidence harmful to
another party, or fighting introduction of evidence only harmful to one party); see also
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978) (recognizing that "to assess the impact
of a conflicts of interests on the attorney's options, tactics and decisions in plea
negotiations would be virtually impossible"). See generally Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942) (acknowledging the difficulty in determining precise degree of
prejudice sustained by defendant as result of joint representation).
137 United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d at 519 (quoting Walker v. United
States, 422 F.2d 374, 375 (3d Cir. 1970) (per curium) (finding the possibility of prejudice
enough to meet the threshold requirement of reversal in the Third Circuit).
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the Sixth Amendment requires state courts themselves to initiate
inquiries into the propriety of multiple representation in every case.
Defense counsel have an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting
representations and to advise the court promptly when a conflict of
interest arises during the course of trial. Absent special circumstances,
therefore, trial courts may assume either that multiple representation
entails no conflict or that the lawyer and his clients knowingly accept
such risk of conflict as may exist.... Unless the trial court knows or
reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the court need
138
not initiate an inquiry.

The Court concluded by stating, "[w]e hold that the possibility
of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction. In
order to demonstrate a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights,
a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest
adversely affected his lawyer's performance."1 39 Lower courts
have come to understand Sullivan as standing for the principle
that a trial court has no duty to conduct an inquiry into a
lawyer's conflict of interest unless it knows, or reasonably should
know, that one exists. Thus an unchallenged, unknown conflict
of interest will not require reversal of a conviction unless the
defendant can show that an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer's performance.1 40
3. Wood v. Georgia
Wood v. Georgial4l arose out of the probation revocation
hearing of two men and one woman convicted of distributing
obscene materials.14 2 Two of the individuals were placed on
138 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980).
139 Id. at 350.
140 See generally Bruce A. Green, "Through a Glass Darkly" How the Court Sees
Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1231 n.129
(1989) (suggesting that hearings dealing with potential conflicts of interest be conducted
unobtrusively); Darrin Hurwitz & Sarah K. Eddy, Thirty-FirstAnnual Review of Criminal
Procedure: III. Trial: Right to Counsel, 90 GEO. L.J. 1579, 1609 (2002) (discussing trial
court's limited duty in conducting inquiry into whether conflict of interest exists); Brent
Coverdale, Comment, Cuyler v. Stricklan& The Proper Standard for Self-Interested
Conflicts of Interest, 47 KAN. L. REV. 209, 223 (1998) (discussing limited time within
which trial court must initiate an inquiry concerning conflict of interest).
141 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
142 See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 264 (indicating that probation violation hearing
occurred Jan. 26, 1979); see also Wood v. State, 258 S.E.2d 171, 171 (1979), vacated by 450
U.S. 261 (1981) (discussing probation orders); Project, Fifteenth Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1984-1985: III.
Trial, 74 GEO. L.J. 751, 753 (1986) (explaining right to counsel at final probation
revocation hearings).
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probation following convictions for working at a local Atlanta
adult theatre. The third was placed on probation pursuant to a
conviction for selling pornographic magazines to an undercover
police officer. 14 3 All three were employed by the same
individual. 144 The employer retained counsel on their behalf and
45
paid all their legal expenses.1
As a condition of probation, separate fines of $5000 were
imposed upon each of the defendants to be paid in monthly
installments of $500.146 The fines, however, went unpaid, 14 7 and,
as a result, probation violations were filed.148 At the hearing,
evidence was offered to establish that the defendants were
incapable of paying the fines levied,14 9 and that their employer
had also reneged on a promise to pay.150 The court ordered the
143 See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 263 (alleging each had violated Ga. Code § 262101); see also Wood v. State, 258 S.E.2d at 171 (stating facts leading up to alleged
violation); Green, supra note 140, at 1225 n.109 (explaining facts of case).
144 See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 264 n.3 (stating record suggests common
ownership of Plaza Theatre, where first two were arrested, and Plaza Adult Bookstore,
where Wood was employed); see also John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the
Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 582 n. 316 (1994)
(referring to common employer of arrested men); Green, supra note 140, at 1225 n.109
(claiming defendants were employees of same employer).
145 See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 266 n.8 (describing that lawyer conceded during
oral argument that he had been paid by employer); see also Capone, supra note 130, at
886 (explaining it came to Court's attention that employer had paid attorney's fees);
Recent Cases, First Circuit Rules That a Defendant Whose Lawyer Had a Conflict That
the Judge Should Have Known About Must Show Adverse Effect To Receive a New Trial:
Mountjoy v. Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, 115 HARV. L. REV. 938, 942 n.40
(2002) (claiming defendants' employer paid lawyer's fees).
146 See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 263 (stating that trial court specified such terms
of probation); see also Wood v. State, 258 S.E.2d at 171 (requiring appellants to pay $500
per month each towards payment of their fines as condition of probation); Green, supra
note 140, at 1225 n. 109 (discussing fines which defendants were ordered to pay).
147 See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 263 (1981) (describing how none of petitioners
had made requisite payments after three months); see also Wood v. State, 258 S.E.2d at
171 (noting defendants failure to make $500 payment as directed); Green, supra note 140,
at 1225 n.109 (stating defendants failed to make required payments).
148 See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 263-64 (explaining how county probation officers
moved for revocation of their probations); see also Wood v. State, 258 S.E.2d at 171
(describing that each appellants' probation was revoked for failing to make payment);
Capone, supra note 130, at 885-86 (discussing revocation of probation for failing to make
mandatory monthly payments).
149 See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 264 (stating petitioners offered convincing
evidence of inability to make payments from their earnings); see also Wood v. State, 258
S.E.2d at 171 (establishing that none of appellants had financial resources to make
payments); Capone, supra note 130, at 885 (classifying defendants as "indigent").
150 See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 266-67 (discussing fees and fines employer had
paid, and fact that he "chose to refuse payment of these fines); see also Capone, supra note
130, at 886 (stating that "employer made a general promise to his employees that he
would pay their fines, but in this situation, did not do so"); Nancy J. Moore, Ethical Issues
in Third-PartyPayment: Beyond the InsuranceDefense Paradigm,16 REV. LITIG. 586, 602
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defendants to either pay the arrearages or serve their respective
deferred sentences. 15 1 Thereafter, the defendants moved for an
alteration of their probation conditions with respect to the
repayment of their fines.15 2 The court denied the motion and
ordered them to jail.15 3 This decision was affirmed by the Georgia
154
Court of Appeals.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider whether the defendants' Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection rights had been violated.155 However, that issue was
ultimately not addressed. The Court determined instead that a
due process violation may have occurred, a condition which
trumped the necessity to resolve the equal protection violation
claim.156 The Court was concerned that counsel for the three
defendants may have been laboring under a conflict of interest by
representing the interests of both the defendants and their
employer.157 Scrutinizing the trial record, the Court identified
the following critical facts:
n.75 (1997) (explaining that defendants assumed their employer would pay their criminal
fines).
151 See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 264 (noting that "the court decided to revoke
these probations unless petitioners made up their arrearages within five days").
152 See id. (stating that the defendants were unable to make up their arrears).
153 See id. (denying the defendants' motion and ordering them to serve remaining jail
sentences).
154 See id. (stating that the Supreme Court granted certiorari only after the
revocation decision was affirmed by the Georgia Court of Appeals).
155 See id. (indicating that the Court took case to consider "whether it is
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause to imprison a probationer solely because
of his inability to make installment payments on fines").
156 See id. at 264-65 (stating that "[o]n closer inspection, however, the record reveals
other facts that make this an inappropriate case in which to decide the constitutional
question. Where, as here, a possible due process violation is apparent on the particular
facts of a case, we are empowered to consider the due process issue."); see also Mickens v.
Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 (2002) (citing the Wood Court's explanation that it could not
examine the Equal Protection claim because "on the record before us, we [could not] be
sure whether counsel was influenced in his basic strategic decisions by the interests of the
employer who hired him"). See generally Hadassah Reimer, Legal Ethics: Stabbed in the
Back, But no Adverse Effect, Mickens v. Taylor, 3 WYO. L. REV. 329, 341 (2003) (noting
that the Court could not analyze the Equal Protection claim because of the possible
conflict of interest).
157 See Wm. C. Turner Herbert, Recent Development: Off the Beaten Path: An
Analysis of the Supreme Court's Surprising Decision in Mickens v. Taylor, 81 N.C. L. REV.
1268, 1274 (2003) (discussing how the case was remanded to determine whether the
lawyer, acting as an agent of the employer, had created a conflict of interest by his
representation of the defendants); see also Matthew S. Nichols, Case Note, United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: Mickens v. Taylor, 13 WASH. & LEE CAP. DEF. J.
393, 399 (2001) (noting that the Supreme Court remanded the trial because "the
possibility of a conflict of interest was 'sufficiently apparent' so as to require the trial
court to determine whether a conflict of interest actually existed"). See generally, Green,
supra note 140, at 1256 (noting that "[i]n cases in which the defendant's interests are
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Petitioners have been represented since the time of their arrests by a
single lawyer. The testimony of each petitioner at the probation
revocation hearing makes it clear that none of them ever paid - or was
expected to pay - the lawyer for his services. They understood that
this legal assistance was provided to them by their employer. In fact,
the transcript of this hearing reveals that legal representation was only
one aspect of the assistance that was promised to petitioners if they
should face legal trouble as a result of their employment. They were
told that their employer also would pay any fines and post any
necessary bonds, and these promises were kept for the most part. In
this case itself, as petitioners' lawyer stated at oral argument, bonds
were posted with funds he provided. In addition, when each of the
petitioners was arrested a second time, he paid the resulting fines. All
aspects of this arrangement were revealed to the court at the
revocation hearing. 158
The Court went on to note that the employer continued to pay
the legal fees following the convictions but declined to pay the
fines.15 9 This led the Court to suspect that the employer may
have been using the defendants to serve his own interest in order
to create the equal protection claim as a test case.160 The
possibility of such a scenario called for an investigation into the
potential conflict of interest.161 The Court recognized that,
particularly weighty, it is less appropriate to require the defendant to bear the risk that
the trial judge is incorrect in predicting that an actual conflict will emerge at trial").
158 Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 266.
159 See id. at 267 (noting that although the "employer chose to refuse payment of
these fines ...it paid other fines and paid the sums necessary to keep petitioners free on
bond").
160 See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 267 (noting that the employer's refusal to pay
these fines suggested the possibility that the employer was seeking its own interest,
which was a resolution of the equal protection claim raised here); see also Reimer, supra
note 156, at 341 (noting that the employer was essentially attempting to create a test case
and was disregarding the best interests of the defendants). See generally Herbert, supra
note 157, at 1274 (discussing how the court justified its remand order without first
requiring an affirmative showing of adverse effect due to the precedent set forth in
Sullivan).
161 See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 267-68. The Court stated:
Although we cannot be sure that the employer and petitioners' attorney were seeking
to create a test case, there is a clear possibility of conflict of interest on these facts.
Indications of this apparent conflict of interest may be found at various stages of the
proceedings below. It was conceded at oral argument here that petitioners raised no
protest about the size of the fines imposed at the time of sentencing. During the
three months leading up to the probation revocation hearing they failed to pay even
small amounts toward their fines to indicate their good faith. In fact, throughout this
period, petitioners apparently remained under the impression that-as promisedthe fines would be paid by the employer. Even at the revocation hearing itself,
petitioners attempted to prove their inability to make the required payments but
failed to make a motion for a modification of those requirements. That motion was
not made until one day before petitioners were due to be incarcerated. A review of
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"[s]ince a lawyer must always be free to exercise his professional
judgment without regard to the interests or motives of a third
person, the lawyer who is employed by one to represent another
must constantly guard against erosion of his professional
freedom."1

62

Having found a potential of conflict, the Court vacated the
revocation judgment and remanded the case for a resolution of
the conflict of interest claim.16 3 The Court further ordered that
should a conflict of interest be found on remand, the revocation
hearing would have to be retried with new counsel.164 In
language that later became the subject of dispute, the Court
concluded by stating:
Because we are presented here only with the question of petitioners'
probation revocations, we do not order more sweeping relief, such as
vacating petitioners' sentences or reversing their convictions. Such
actions do, however, remain within the discretion of the trial court
upon appropriatemotion. There also is the possibility that this relief
may be available in habeas corpus proceedings, if petitioners can
show an actual conflict of interest during the trials or at the time of
65
sentencing.1

This remand instruction seemingly opened the door for a
mandatory reversal rule in cases where a conflict of interest
existed at the time of trial was not addressed, although known or
reasonably foreseeable to the trial court.166
these facts demonstrates that, if petitioners' counsel was serving the employer's
interest in setting a precedent, this conflict in goals may well have influenced the
decision of the trial court to impose such large fines, as well as the decision to revoke
petitioners' probations rather than to modify the conditions.
Id. See also Reimer, supra note 156, at 341 (noting that the court reasoned that "[tihe
possible conflict of interest was apparent enough in the record to impose a duty to inquire
upon the trial court"). See generally Mark W. Shiner, Conflicts of Interest Challenges Post
Mickens v. Taylor: Redefining the Defendant's Burden in Concurrent, Successive, and
PersonalInterest Conflicts, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 965, 977-78 (2003) (noting that "[t]he
problem was that the Court in Wood used the phrase "actual conflict of interest" without
the modifier previously found in Cuyler-that the conflict 'adversely effect' counsel's
performance").
162 Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 271.
163 See id. at 273 (noting that "th[e] record strongly suggests [a conflict of interest]
actually existed at the time of the probation revocation or earlier.").
164 See id. at 273-74 (explaining instruction given on remand).
165 See id. at 274.
166 See Reimer, supra note 156, at 342 (analyzing the courts holding that "if an actual
conflict of interest was found, a new revocation hearing was to be held 'untainted by a
legal representative serving conflicting interests"'); see also Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at
273 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 337 (1980)) (noting that "Sullivan mandates a
reversal when the trial court has failed to make an inquiry even though it 'knows or
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III. MICKENS V. TAYLOR

A.

The Facts of Mickens

Walter Mickens was accused of murdering seventeen-year-old
Timothy Hall.167 Hall was killed sometime during the evening
hours of March 28, 1992, in Newport News, Virginia.16 8 His body
was discovered by a pedestrian two days later "lying face down
on a mattress under a sheet of plywood."1 6 9 Death was the result
70
of multiple stab wounds to several parts of the body.1
reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists."'). But see Herbert, supra note
157, at 1275 (noting that "Wood mandates reversal upon a showing only that an actual
conflict existed, without an additional showing of adverse effect").
167 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 164 (2002) (stating that "[iun 1993, a Virginia
jury convicted petitioner Mickens of the premeditated murder of Timothy Hall during or
following the commission of an attempted forcible sodomy"); see also Mickens v. Taylor,
240 F.3d 348, 351-53 (2001) (4th Cir. 2001) (describing a detailed listing of the facts
leading up to the accusation). See generally Capone, supra note 130, at 881 (noting that
after the jury trial, Mickens was sentenced to death).
168 See Mickens v. Commonwealth, 442 S.E.2d 678, 682 (Va. 1994) (stating that the
"medical examiner.., estimated that the victim could have lived as long as 30 to 40
minutes after infliction of the last wound and that, during this time, the victim may have
been conscious"); see also Reimer, supra note 156, at 329 (noting that "[Hall's] 14 year-old
roommate, whom Hall had dropped off at a party near the area where his body was later
discovered, was the last to see Hall alive on the night of March 28, 1992). See generally
Grunewald, supra note 6, at 137 (noting that scientific evidence placed Mickens at the
scene of the murder).
169 Mickens v. Commonwealth, 442 S.E.2d at 682. The Supreme Court of Virginia
described the crime scene this way:
The [victim's] body was nude from the waist down ...and its legs were spread apart
approximately 12 inches ... Pubic hairs were recovered from the victim's buttocks.
Bloody "transfer" stains were evident on the outsides of the victim's thighs, and a
white liquid substance was observed close to the victim's anus. Cigarette butts lying
near the mattress also were recovered, and the mattress cover was seized for
scientific examination. Nearby, the police found a pair of men's blue jeans and white
underwear shorts that had washed up in the surf of the river ... identified ... as
those worn by Hall on the evening of March 28, 1992.
Id. at 682.
170 See id. The autopsy of Hall's corpse:
revealed 143 separate "sharp force injuries" to the victim's body. Of the injuries, 62
were paired stab injuries that could have been caused by a multiple-blade knife, 13
were single stab wounds, and three were paired incised wounds. The medical
examiner who performed the autopsy concluded that the victim had bled to death and
that 25 of the 143 wounds were fatal. The fatal wounds included four pairs of stab
wounds that punctured the right lung, three single stab wounds that punctured the
left lung, seven stab wounds to the skull that penetrated the brain, a stab wound to
the forehead that also penetrated the brain, one pair of stab wounds that perforated
the liver, and a pair of stab wounds to the right neck that severed the carotid artery
and the jugular vein.
Id. See also Reimer, supra note 156, at 329. The author noted that the body was found
along the James River in Newport News, Virginia. See generally Capone, supra note 130,
at 886. When Hall's body was discovered, there was also evidence of recent sexual
activity indicating possible sexual assault.
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On April 4, 1992, the Newport News police arrested Walter
Mickens for an alleged assault on a minor. 17 1 After Miranda
warnings, Mickens agreed to speak with the arresting officer. 172
During this questioning, and without discussing the specific facts
surrounding Hall's murder, the officer "told Mickens that he
knew Mickens had killed Hall."17 3 Mickens responding by
stating, "[y]ou didn't find any knife on me, did you?"'174 The
following day, when Mickens was arrested pursuant to an arrest
warrant for the Hall murder, he told police officers, "'I accept the
warrants; I accept the charges

. . .

if I told you I accept the

warrants that means I'm guilty, don't it?"'175
On April 6, 1992, Bryan Saunders was appointed by the court
to represent Walter Mickens on the charge of murder. 176 Mickens
was not aware that, until the business day prior to his
assignment to Mickens' case, Mr. Saunders represented Timothy
Hall, the man Mickens was now accused of murdering, in a

171 See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 352 (stating that "Officer D.A. Seals and
Detective Dallas Mitchell of the Newport News police responded to a complaint that a
black male traveling on a bicycle had assaulted a juvenile"); see also Capone, supra note
130, at 887 (stating that "[flive days after Hall's body was found, police officers responding
to the report of an assault upon a juvenile saw Mickens fleeing the parking lot of the
building where the crime took place and arrested him"). See generally Reimer, supra note
156, at 329 (noting that he was arrested on charges unrelated to the murder).
172 See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 352 (describing the procedure after Mickens'
arrest); see also Reimer, supra note 156, at 329 (noting that overwhelming evidence
against Mickens began to surface after he was arrested). See generally Capone, supra note
130, at 887 (stating that Mickens revealed the means of Hall's murder).
173 Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 352 (stating that this questioning was initiated
without disclosure of the way Hall had been murdered).
174 See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 352 (replying in a way that denied his
involvement in the murder); see also Capone, supra note 167, at 887 (noting that by
stating he possessed no knife, he demonstrated he correctly knew of the murder weapon).
See generally Reimer, supra note 156, at 329 (noting that "[w]hile incarcerated, Mickens
also made confessions to his cellmate about the sodomy and murder of Timothy Hall").
175 Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 352 (confirming Mickens' answer, Officer Seals
asked him again if he understood correctly what Mickens was saying); see also Capone,
supra note 130, at 887 (discussing how Mickens eventually admitted guilt to both the
murder and forcible sodomy charges). See generally Reimer, supra note 156, at 329
(depicting the general atmosphere that led to his admission).
176 See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 354 (summarizing the events surrounding the
appointment of Saunders as Mickens' counsel); Frank Green, Conflict Case to be Heard;
Lawyer Represented Victim and Slayer, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Nov. 4, 2001, at B8
(noting that a judge appointed Saunders to represent Mickens); Brooke A. Masters,
Attorney's Ties To Inmate, Victim Spur Effort to Halt Va. Execution, WASH. POST, Apr. 6,
2001, at B5 (commenting that Saunders was a local lawyer with a heavy load of courtappointed cases).
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separate

criminal

defendant.1

77

matter

where

Hall

himself

was

the

In February 1992, Hall's mother filed charges against her son
for assault and battery. Hall was arrested and charged in March
1992 with possessing a concealed weapon. 17 8 Saunders met with
Hall in late March 1992, no more than eight days before Hall's
death, to discuss the charges against the 17 year old.179 Because
of Hall's death, Saunders was relieved in that matter on April 3,
1992 by Judge Foster. Three days later the same judge assigned
Saunders to represent Mickens.180 Thereafter, Judge Foster
presided over Mickens' murder trial. Neither Saunders nor
Judge Foster ever disclosed to Mickens anything about Saunders'
prior representation of Timothy Hall, the man he was accused of
murdering. 181
Although there was strong evidence that Walter Mickens had
committed both the sodomy and the murder of Hall,18 2 the
177 See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 354 (stating that Mickens never learned of the
prior representation until federal habeas corpus counsel discovered it in the victim's file);
Green, supra note 176, at B8 (noting that Saunders did not disclose to Mickens that he
had previously represented Hall); Masters, supra note 176, at B5 (articulating that
Mickens did not find out about the prior representation for five years).
178 See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 354 (outlining details of Hall's previous
arrests); Joan Biskupic, High Court Halts Virginia.. Execution the Day Before, USA
TODAY, Apr. 17, 2001, at 4A (noting that Saunders previously represented Hall in earlier
juvenile court matters); Frank Green, Appeals Hold Mickens' Fate, RICHMOND TIMES
DISPATCH, Apr. 16, 2001, at B2 (observing that Saunders represented Hall on charges of
carrying a concealed weapon and assaulting his mother).
179 See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 354 (observing that Hall and Saunders met
somewhere between March 20 and March 28, 1992); Associated Press, Court Delays
Execution, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Apr. 16, 2001, at A6 (remarking that
Saunders represented Hall days before Saunders was assigned to Mickens); Virginia
Governor is Asked to Stop Execution Tonight, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2002, at A18 (noting
that Saunders and Hall only met briefly to discuss the charges filed against Hall).
180 See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 354 (noting that Judge Foster entered a
handwritten order on Hall's docket sheet dismissing the charges due to his death); Tom
Campbell, New Trial or Release Ordered; Lawyer's Conflict Cited in Capital Case,
RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Sept. 15, 2000, at Al (stating that the same judge who
dismissed charges against Hall also appointed Saunders to defend Mickens); Tony Mauro,
High Court Airs Capital Conflict From Virginia; Defense Counsel at Trial Worked for
Victim Before Being Appointed to Represent Accused Killer Walter Mickens, LEGAL TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2001, at 8 (observing that charges were dismissed against Hall due to his death).
181 See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 354 (observing that Saunders never told
Mickens of his prior representation); Campbell, supra note 180, at Al (claiming that
Foster made no inquiry of Saunders regarding conflicts); Green, supra note 176, at B8
(stating that Saunders did not disclose his prior representation to either the lawyer
assisting him or Mickens).
182 See Mickens v. Commonwealth, 442 S.E.2d 678, 682-83 (Va. 1994), vacated 513
U.S. 922 (1994), rev'd, 227 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2000), affd 535 U.S. 162 (2002)
(summarizing Mickens' confession at the time of his arrest, physical evidence linking
Mickens to the crime scene, and Mickens' confession to a cell mate); Green, supra note
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defense strategy at trial was that Walter Mickens was not the
assailant. 8 3 The defense maintained this position despite other
evidence suggesting that Hall was a male prostitute, that the
murder occurred in an area known for male prostitution, and
that the sodomy was consensual-a fact which, if raised, could
have prevented the death sentence despite a conviction.184
Mickens was convicted of murder18 5 and sentenced to death
based upon the jury's finding of the necessary aggravating
circumstances. 186
Walter Mickens first learned of his attorney's conflict when the
lawyer appointed to represent him in federal habeas corpus
proceedings reviewed files provided by the county clerk.18 7 Due to
an inadvertent disclosure of Hall's juvenile file, the prior charges,
representation, and contact between Hall and Saunders were
revealed.188 Thereafter, Mickens filed a writ of habeas corpus in
the Eastern District of Virginia alleging that he was denied the

176, at B8 (stating that Mickens allegedly confessed killing to a fellow inmate in jail);
Masters, supra note 176, at B5 (noting that DNA stains on mattress underneath the
victim matched Mickens' DNA).
183 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 181-82 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing possible defense strategies); Charles Lane, Court Clears Way for Virginia
Execution; Lawyer Conflict Allegation Rejected, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2002, at A1 (stating
that Mickens denied ever meeting Hall); Andrea D. Lyon, State Strict on Lawyer Conflicts
in Capital Cases, CHI. DAILY LAW BULLETIN, Apr. 27, 2002, at 9 (noting that Mickens'
testimony denied any involvement with Hall, despite the evidence).
184 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 181-82 (arguing that forcible sodomy was a
prerequisite for the death penalty); Green, supra note 178, at B2 (explaining that if
sodomy was consensual and not forced, then there could be no capital murder and thus no
death sentence); Mauro, supra note 180, at 8 (stating that newspaper accounts suggesting
Hall was a prostitute could have affected Mickens' case if the sexual relations were found
to be consensual).
185 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 164 (stating that a jury convicted Mickens of
premeditated murder); Biskupic, supra note 178, at 4A (noting that Mickens' conviction
occurred in 1993); Campbell, supra note 180, at Al (reporting that Mickens was convicted
for murdering Hall).
186 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 164 (finding the murder "outrageously and
wantonly vile"); Green, supra note 176, at B8 (remarking that Mickens was sentenced to
death for the 1992 slaying of Hall); Masters, supra note 176, at B5 (stating that Mickens
was convicted and sentenced to death in 1993).
187 See Mickens v .Taylor, 535 U.S. at 164-65 (recounting how federal habeas corpus
counsel discovered the conflict of interest); Biskupic, supra note 178, at 4A (stating that
the prior representation was discovered during an appeal to federal court); Mauro, supra
note 180, at 8 (explaining that Saunders' dual representation was not discovered until
new lawyers reviewed Mickens case).
188 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 165 (noting that the clerk mistakenly gave
federal habeas corpus counsel Hall's file); Campbell, supra note 180, at Al (reporting that
"the clerk slipped up and produced Hall's file"); Masters, supra note 176, at B5
(summarizing circumstances surrounding disclosure of prior representation).
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effective assistance of counsel during his trial.189 Following an
evidentiary hearing, the petition for relief was denied by the
district court. A divided panel for the Fourth Circuit reversed
and granted a rehearing en banc.19o

At that rehearing, the Virginia District Court initially found
that despite Virginia's claims that any relief based on ineffective
assistance of counsel was barred under state law,19 1 Mickens'
claim was not barred since he had no prior notice of Saunders'
conflict.1 9 2 The District Court then applied the framework
articulated in Sullivan to analyze Mickens' claim.1 93 Addressing
the first prong of the Sullivan test, the existence of an actual
conflict, the District Court concluded that Saunders'
representation of Mickens did not rise to the level of conflict.194
In reaching this conclusion, the District Court relied heavily on
189 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 164 (stating that he was denied effective
counsel due to the alleged conflict of interest); Biskupic, supra note 178, at 4A
(summarizing Mickens' arguments); Green, supra note 176, at B8 (contending that
Mickens may have been denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
190 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 165 (noting that a divided panel reversed and
the Court of Appeals granted a rehearing en banc); Campbell, supra note 180, at Al
(noting that a three judge panel ruled in favor of release or a new trial); Barbara Grzincic,
THE DAILY RECORD (Baltimore), Oct. 31, 2000, at 1C (commenting that appellate court
vacated its opinion and will rehear the matter en banc).
191 See Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1354 n.1 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that
under Virginia state law, "a petitioner is barred from raising any claim in a successive
petition if the facts as to that claim were either known 'or available' to the petitioner at
the time of his original petition"); Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d 586, 600 n.9 (E.D.
Va. 1999), rev'd, 227 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2000), affd 535 U.S. 162 (2002) (stating that state
claims are barred if facts of that claim were either known or should have been known to
petitioner at the time of his original claim ); Masters, supra note 176, at B5 (noting that
Mickens attorneys learned of the conflict too late to file in state court).
192 See Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 600-02 (summarizing reasons for
rejection of claim); Brooke A. Masters & Charles Lane, High Court Halts Execution in
Virginia;Defense Lawyer's Role at Issue, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2001, at Al (commenting
because state court appeals had run out, Mickens only remedy was to try to argue in
federal court that Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated). See generally Jennifer
Bier, Virginia Appellate Report, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 25, 2000, at 25 (discussing Mickens'
case).
193 See Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 602 (stating that there are two theories
a defendant may proceed under to prove a deprivation of Sixth Amendment right to
conflict-free counsel); see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-49 (1980) (asserting
that defendant must show that "an actual interest adversely affected his lawyer's
performance"); Enoch v. Gramely, 70 F.3d 1490, 1496 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that
defendant can either proceed on theory that the attorney had a potential conflict of
interest that prejudiced his defense or that an actual conflict adversely affected his
defense).
194 See Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 604-06 (rejecting Mickens' arguments
pertaining to proof of actual conflict); Grzincic, supra note 190, at 1C (distinguishing
conflict in Sullivan from conflict in Mickens' case); see also Campbell, supra note 180, at
Al (noting that Court of Appeals reversed District Court decision and instead found an
actual conflict).
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Saunders' perception of the prior representation of Hall. 19 5
Saunders stated that any "allegiance to Hall, 'ended when I
walked in the courtroom and they told me he was dead and the
case was gone."'196 The District Court held that "[w]ithout
condoning the inexcusable failure to disclose the previous
representation of Hall ...as a factual matter, Saunders did not
believe that any 'continuing duties to [a] former client [might]
interfere with his consideration of all facts and options for his
97
current client."'1
Under the second part of the Sullivan inquiry, the District
Court employed a three-step test to determine if the conflict
adversely affected the representation.
First, he must point to some plausible alternative defense strategy or
tactic [that] might have been pursued. Second, he must demonstrate
that the alternative strategy or tactic was reasonable under the facts.
Because prejudice is presumed, the petitioner need not show that the
defense would necessarily have been successful if the alternative
strategy or tactic had been used, rather he only need prove that the
alternative possessed sufficient substance to be a viable alternative.
Finally, he must show some link between the actual conflict and the
decision to forgo the alternative strategy of defense. 198
Mickens contended that there were other reasonable defense
strategies not adopted or investigated because of Saunders'
conflict.199 Specifically, Mickens argued that a consensual
sodomy defense could have been used to avoid the death
penalty. 2 00 However, the District Court found that "the record

195 See Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 606 (highlighting that Saunders did not
perceive his dual representation as a conflict); see also United States v. Young, 644 F.2d
1008, 1014 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding that "great weight" should be placed on lawyer's
perception); Tom Campbell, Murder Trial Scrutinized; Did Lawyer Have Interest Conflict,
RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Dec. 7, 2000, at B7 (announcing that judge found that
Saunders did not perceive any conflicts).
196 Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 605.
197 Id. at 606 (quoting United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 1991)).
198 Id. at 603-04 (quoting Freund v. Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839 (11th Cir. 1999)).
199 Id. at 606 (asserting that conflict foreclosed presentation of consent defense);
Campbell, supra note 180, at Al (questioning if some of what Saunders knew may have
supported other defenses); Green, supra note 176, at B8 (noting that Saunders ignored
information that cast Hall in a bad light which may have affected Mickens' defense).
200 See Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 606-07 (listing facts relevant to a
consent defense); Green, supra note 178, at B2 (noting that Saunders could not have been
sentenced to death had the sodomy been consensual); Mauro, supra note 180, at 8 (stating
that raising issue of consensual sex would have affected Mickens' case).
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shows that other facts foreclosed presentation of consent as a
plausible alternative defense strategy."20 1
In rejecting the possible consent defense, the court pointed
specifically to several findings. The court indicated that Hall had
a tendency to be in the area where his body was discovered for
purposes inconsistent with male prostitution. 20 2 Also, evidence of
a choke hold used on Hall in conjunction with the murder and
the presence of transferred blood stains on Hall's body were not
suggestive of consensual sodomy. 2 0 3 Finally, Mickens' failure to
assert a defense predicated on consent prior to the current
proceedings also favored rejecting Mickens' ineffective assistance
20
of counsel claim. 4

While the Fourth Circuit initially reversed that decision in
2000,205 a rehearing en banc affirmed the District Court's
decision.206 Much of the Court of Appeal's decision focused on
Wood v. Georgia and its requirements. 2 07 Mickens asserted that a
footnote in Wood suggested that reversal was mandatory where a
trial court fails to inquire into a conflict of interest that it has
201 See Mickens v. Geene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
202 See id. (indicating that Hall would sometimes be in area to "watch the water"); see
also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 178-79 (2002) (agreeing with district court that
raising issue of negative facts about victim would not have risen conflict of interest to
level of constitutional violation); Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 361 (4th Cir. 2001)
(stating district court conclusion that Saunders did not have enough evidence to prove
negative rumors about victim and would have been inconsistent with current defense
theory).
203 See Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 607 (explaining Hall had blue marks on
his neck which is indicative of choke hold and therefore lack of consent); see also Mickens
v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 178 (relying on district court finding that, given victim's condition
when body found, there could be no defense of consent to sexual intercourse). See
generally Mickens v. Commonwealth, 442 S.E.2d 678, 682 n.1 (Va. 1994) (defining bloody
"transfer" stain as stain which results from object that first comes into contact with blood
and then touches another surface, leaving blood stain on second surface).
204 See Mickens v. Taylor, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 607 (concluding Saunders did not utilize
consent defense because facts of case and Mickens' testimony would not support
assertion); see also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 173-74 (confirming necessity of finding
conflict of interest caused adverse affect on representation and relied on Court of Appeals
in finding adverse affect); Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 362 (affirming district court's
factual findings and rejecting sixth amendment challenge based on adverse effect of
conflict).
205 Mickens v. Taylor, 227 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2000) (reversing denial of habeas corpus
relief); see also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 165 (reviewing procedural history).
206 Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 362 (2001) (granting rehearing and denying
relief); see also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 165 (reviewing procedural history).
207 Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 358-60 (discussing whether Wood extended
automatic reversal rule); see also Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 273 n.18 (1981) (stating
reversal is required when the trial court failed to make inquiry into presence of conflict of
interest in certain circumstances); Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d 296, 302 (2d Cir. 1995)
(applying Wood to create rule of automatic reversal).
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reason to know exists. 2 08 That footnote stated that "Sullivan
mandates a reversal when the trial court has failed to make an
inquiry even though it 'knows or reasonably should know that a

particular conflict exists."' 2 09 This contention was rejected
because the footnote cited by Mickens was in response to Justice
White's dissent, which suggested that the Wood holding could be
used to justify mandatory reversal regarding potential Sixth
Amendment claims found by appellate courts.
The Fourth
Circuit opined that a broad reading of that footnote, one
requiring mandatory reversal, would be well beyond its intended
scope, and limited it merely to a duty of further inquiry by a trial
court where the possibility of conflict existed and was not
remedied at that level. 2 10
Alternatively, Mickens argued that Wood altered the second
prong of the Sullivan inquiry. 2 11 He contended that where a trial
court has neglected its duty to inquire into a known conflict, or
one the court should have been aware existed, the claimant need
not show an adverse effect on counsel's performance. 2 12 Instead,

Mickens argued that the remand instruction in Wood suggested
that a new trial had to be granted in such cases. 2 1 3 The Court of
Appeals rejected this assertion because it interpreted the
Supreme Court's remand instruction in Wood as merely a way to
initiate the lower court into beginning the Sullivan two-part
208 See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 358 (discussing validity of Mickens' argument);
see also Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 273 n.18 (stating reversal is required when trial
court failed to make inquiry into presence of conflict of interest in certain circumstances);
Ciak, 59 F.3d at 302 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying Wood to create rule of automatic reversal).
209 Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 358 n.5 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 273
n.18 (1981)).
210 See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 359 (discussing reason for footnote was in
response to dissenting opinion); see also Brien v. United States, 695 F.2d 10, 15 n.10 (1st
Cir. 1982) (refusing to adopt automatic reversal rule). See generally United States v.
Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 379 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing automatic reversal rule but refusing to
apply to reverse conviction).
211 See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 359 (discussing details of alternate argument);
see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) (requiring proof of actual conflict and
adverse effect). See generally Ciak, 59 F.3d at 301 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining two-step
process for prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief).
212 See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 359 (stating reasoning for expanding
interpretation due to remand instruction); see also Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348 (requiring
proof of adverse effect on representation as second prong of inquiry). See generally
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485-86 (1977) (requiring trial courts to initiate
investigation of conflict of interest upon timely objection).
213 See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 359 (describing remand instruction of Wood);
see also Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 274 (providing remand instruction for trial court).
See generally Ciak, 59 F.3d at 302 (applying Wood to reverse conviction).
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inquiry. 2 14 The United States Supreme Court granted Walter
Mickens a stay of execution and granted his petition for
certiorari. 2 15
B.

The Mickens Court's Opinion

The Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit. In an opinion authored
by Justice Scalia, the Court concluded that Wood simply
reaffirmed the Court's holding in Sullivan, "that a defendant who
shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of
his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to
obtain relief," and that Mickens did not meet that burden on
these facts. 2 16 Although Mickens argued that Wood created,
through its remand instruction, a rule requiring the automatic
reversal of unresolved conflicts of interest that were known, or
should have been known, to the trial court, Justice Scalia noted
that the key language Mckens' relied upon pertained only to
Wood, where the Court "remanded... 'to determine whether the
conflict of interest that this record strongly suggests actually
existed."' 2 17 Thus, the Wood remand instruction was held not to
apply on the facts in Mickens. 2 18
Justice Scalia began by noting the general rule recognized by
Strickland, requiring that counsel be effective to meet the
constitutional mandate. 2 19 He also noted that a defendant
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that
counsel's unprofessional errors had a prejudicial effect on the

214 See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 359-60 (explaining that to rely on remand
instruction would be to overrule by implication which is not common practice); see also
Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348 (requiring proof of adverse effect on representation to satisfy
second prong of inquiry). See generally Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. South Carolina,
978 F.2d 1334, 1347 (4th Cir. 1992) (refusing to overrule by implication).
215 Mickens v. Taylor, 532 U.S. 970 (2001) (granting writ of certiorari); see also
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 165-66 (2002) (reviewing procedural history).
216 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U. S. at 171.
217 Id. at 170.
218 Id. at 166 (indicating the Court felt this particular conflict did not rise to the level
of a constitutional violation and thus did not require that relief be afforded).
219 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 166 (noting that Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is for purpose of criminal defendant receiving fair trial); see also Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537-38 (2003) (affirming general rule that ineffective assistance
claim requires proving deficient performance); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984) (stating first component of successful sixth amendment claim is proving
counsel's representation was deficient).
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trial outcome to overcome a claim of harmless error. 2 20 Beyond
this general rule, Justice Scalia indicated that the Court has

recognized exceptions. One such situation, where the Court has
"spared the defendant the need of showing probable effect upon
the outcome, and [has] simply presumed such effect, [is] where
assistance of counsel has been denied entirely or during a critical
stage of the proceeding." 22 1 In such circumstances, Justice Scalia
noted the Court has recognized that any outcome is likely to be so
unreliable that a case-by-case review is unnecessary. 222 In
addition, Justice Scalia indicated that other situations, those
"when the defendant's attorney actively represented conflicting
interests," can also lead to equally unreliable results and called
for a similar remedy. 223 With those exceptions in mind, Justice
Scalia noted that decision of the case at hand required the
24
detailed examination of prior case law. 2

In examining Halloway, Justice Scalia noted that the case
involved a situation where counsel was forced to represent
multiple clients despite timely objections. He indicated that this
circumstance "undermined the adversarial process ...

because

joint representation of conflicting interests is inherently suspect,
and because counsel's conflicting obligations to multiple
defendants 'effectively seal his lips on crucial matters."' 22 5 Based

on these facts, Justice Scalia concluded that Holloway's
automatic reversal rule operates only where an attorney raises
an objection to a conflict of interest arising from joint concurrent
22 6
representation and is denied relief.

220 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 166; see also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19,
22 (2002) (noting proper standard to prove prejudice is a "reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different"); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (finding deficient representation must also have
prejudicial effect on defense).
221 Mickens v. Taylor 535 U.S. at 166.
222 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 166 (indicating that circumstances that rise to
an outright denial of counsel where constitutionally required create situations where
judicial review is unnecessary).
223 See id. at 166.
224 See id. at 167 (noting that the Court will analyze its prior jurisprudence in "some
detail"); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984) (holding that
representation that is at level of denial of Sixth Amendment rights is presumptively
defective).
225 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 168.
226 Id. at 168 (stating "Holloway thus creates an automatic reversal rule only where
defense counsel is forced to represent codefendants over his timely objection, unless the
trial court has determined that there is no conflict"); see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435
U.S. 475, 487 (1977) (explaining that holding does not prevent trial court from
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Justice Scalia then turned to Sullivan. He indicated that
Sullivan was a case where no objection to multiple
representation was made where three co-defendants, each tried
individually, were represented by the same attorney. Since no
objection was made to the multiple representation, Justice Scalia
observed that the Sullivan Court refused to apply and extend the
Holloway reversal rule on those facts. 22 7 Instead, the Court in
Sullivan held that "absent objection, a defendant must
demonstrate that 'a conflict of interest actually affected the
adequacy of his representation."' 2 28
Separately, Justice Scalia noted that the Sullivan Court
addressed the issue of whether a trial court has a duty to inquire
into potential conflicts arising from multiple representation.
Justice Scalia indicated that the Halloway inquiry is only
required when "'the trial court knows or reasonably should know
that a particular conflict exists,' which is not to be confused with
when the trial court is aware of a vague unspecified possibility of
conflict." 22 9 Justice Scalia noted that although Mickens read
Sullivan as extending Holloway's automatic reversal rule to any
unobjected to conflict, the Holloway inquiry and automatic
reversal rule will only apply in the aforementioned situation,
where the conflict of interest is, or should be, apparent to the
trial court on its face and not an ambiguous potential for the
conflict. 2 30
Finally, Justice Scalia examined Wood. He indicated that in
Wood, certiorari was granted in order to address an Equal
Protection Claim, but was ultimately remanded for a
determination as to whether a conflict of interest existed. 2 3 1 In
that case, Justice Scalia noted that the Court identified

investigating basis of conflict of interest). But see Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193, 1198
(9th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing facts of Holloway and interpolating between holdings of
Cuyler and Holloway).
227 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 168 (discussing the Court's refusal to apply the
Holloway inquiry to the facts presented in Sullivan).
228 Id. (citations omitted).
229 Id. at 169 (citations omitted).
230 Id. (stating that the Holloway inquiry and automatic reversal rule is only
triggered where "the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular
conflict exists,' which is not to be confused with when the trial court is aware of a vague,
unspecified possibility of conflict." (citations omitted)).
231 See id. at 169-70 (noting that the Court remanded Wood for a determination of a
potential conflict of interest).
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resolution. 23 2
required
that
circumstances"
"disturbing
Specifically, Justice Scalia indicated that Wood was a situation
where multiple defendants were represented by the same
attorney who was being paid by the third-party employer of each
of the defendants. 23 3
This, Justice Scalia stated, led to
uncertainty for the Court regarding "whether counsel was
influenced in his basic strategic decisions by the interests of the
employer who hired him" and the Court remanded for a
determination of whether that conflict prejudiced the
defendants. 23 4
Justice Scalia then focused on the thrust of Mickens argument
for reversal. He indicated that Mickens sought reversal on the
ground that "the remand instruction in Wood established an
'unambiguous rule' that where the trial judge neglects a duty to
inquire into a potential conflict, the defendant, to obtain reversal
of the judgment, need only show that his lawyer was subject to a
conflict of interest, and need not show that the conflict adversely
affected counsel's performance" 23 5 However, Justice Scalia again
noted that Wood itself was not heard by the Court to address a
conflict of interest, rather the Court raised the issue sua sponte
based upon a suspect record indicating influence by a third party
to the litigation. 23 6 Although the Court remanded Wood for a
determination of that potential conflict, and gave instructions to
reverse if it actually existed, Justice Scalia concluded that since
Wood involved an issue raised only by the Court itself, it created
no new exception beyond those previously recognized. 23 7
Further, Justice Scalia concluded that the language used by the
Court in Wood "was shorthand for the statement in Sullivan that
'a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually
232 Id. (indicating that the record reflected potential undue influence by third-party
employer of defendants); see also Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272 (1981) (explaining
attorney was representing defendants and interests of employer simultaneously). See
generally Brien v. United States, 695 F.2d 10, 15 n.10 (1st 1982) (interpreting Wood as
not requiring automatic reversal when judge should reasonably know conflict exists).
233 See supra note 232 and the accompanying text.
234 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 170.
235 Id.

236 See id. at 171-72 (indicating that the record reflected potential undue influence by
the third-party employer of the defendants in the case).
237 See id. The Court concluded that "[t]he notion that Wood created a new rule sub
silentio - and in a case where certiorari had been granted on an entirely different
question, and the parties had neither briefed nor argued the conflict-of-interest issue - is
implausible." Id. at 172.
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affected the adequacy of his representationneed not demonstrate
prejudice in order to obtain relief."' 238
Given the majority's reading of these cases, Scalia concluded
that:
Since [Mickens] was not a case in which (as in Holloway) counsel
protested his inability simultaneously to represent multiple defendants;
and since the trial court's failure to make the Sullivan-mandated
inquiry does not reduce the petitioner's burden of proof; it was at least
necessary, to void the conviction, for petitioner to establish that the
conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel's performance. The
Court of Appeals having found no such effect, the denial of habeas
2 39
relief must be affirmed.
Justice Scalia further opined that Mickens' "proposed rule
of automatic reversal when there existed a conflict that did not
affect counsel's performance, but the trial judge failed to make
the Sullivan-mandated inquiry, [made] little policy sense." 240
Scalia felt that neither the presence or absence of a trial court's
knowledge of the potential conflict of interest nor any affirmative
obligation by that court to conduct a "Sullivan-mandated
inquiry" will make it more difficult for a reviewing court to
determine the effect of such conflict since "those courts may rely
on evidence and testimony whose importance only becomes
established at the trial."241 In addition, Justice Scalia found that
the threat of sanctions which could lead to "the risk of conferring
a windfall upon the defendant" was unnecessary particularly
because the Court does not "presume that judges are as careless
or as partial as those police officers who need the incentive of the
exclusionary rule." 242 Beyond this, Justice Scalia indicated that
the "incentive" to conduct the Sullivan inquiry already exists
with respect to those cases in which the conflict is an actual one,

238 Id. at 171 (citations omitted).
239 Id. at 173-74.
240 Id. at 172 (noting that decisions should not be automatically reversed if no inquiry
into existence of concrete misrepresentation took place); see Koste v. Dormire, 345 F.3d
974, 981 (8th Cir. 2003) (specifying defendant must prove actual conflict existed for
automatic reversal (quoting Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348-49)); cf. McFarland v. Yukins, 356
F.3d 688, 700 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating proper time for automatic reversal and rationale
behind it).
241 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 173.
242 Id.
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and that any extension of this rule would bear little effect on the
2
"deterrence of 'judicial dereliction'." 43
Justice Scalia then discussed the scope of the issue raised by
Mickens.244 He stated that "the only question presented was the
effect of a trial court's failure to inquire into a potential conflict
upon the Sullivan rule that deficient performance of counsel
must be shown." 245 In resolving this issue, Justice Scalia stated
that "the rule applied when the trial judge is not aware of the
conflict (and thus not obligated to inquire) is that prejudice will
be presumed only if the conflict has significantly affected
counsel's performance- thereby rendering the verdict unreliable,
even though Strickland prejudice cannot be shown." 246 Even if
Mickens could make the showing of prejudice required by
Sullivan, he failed to show any adverse effect on the trial's
outcome resulting from that prejudice. This rule was contrary to
holdings in the various Courts of Appeal "which have applied
Sullivan 'unblinkingly' to 'all kinds of alleged attorney ethical
conflicts."' 2 47 Although Justice Scalia questioned such a broad
reading of Sullivan, citing both Rule 44(c) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 2 48 and Strickland,he noted that the question
243 Id.
244 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 174 (noting that only one question was
presented for discussion); see also Tueros v. Greiner, 343 F.3d 587, 593 (2d Cir. 2003)
(specifying limited scope of the issue in Mickens); Smith v. Hofbauer, 312 F.3d 809, 815-16
(6th Cir. 2002) (cautioning that the holding of Mickens is limited to specific issue
presented by Scalia).
245 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 174 (stating sole issue for Court to resolve at that
time).
246 Id. at 172-73 (discussing applicable law regarding when prejudice might arise); see
Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783 (1987) (emphasizing that prejudice cannot be
presumed unless actual conflict of interest adversely affected attorney's representation);
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) (specifying that party must object and make
trial court aware of possible conflict that may have impaired fairness for reviewing court
to determine if real conflict existed).
247 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 174 (quoting Beets v. Collins, 65 F.3d 1258, 1266
(5th Cir. 1995)) (observing how circuit courts have applied standard adopted in Sullivan
to variety of conflicts). See generally United States v. Hanoum, 33 F.3d 1128, 1130 (9th
Cir. 1994) (applying standard to conflict where attorney engaged in sexual relations with
client's wife); United States v. Michaud, 925 F.2d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1991) (considering
whether conflict existed when attorney contesting tax fraud had previously educated IRS
agents).
248 FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 44(c). Rule 44(c) states, in relevant part:
(c) Joint representation. Whenever two or more defendants have been jointly charged
pursuant to Rule 8(b) or have been joined for trial pursuant to Rule 8(b) or have been
joined for trial pursuant to Rule 13, and are represented by the same retained or
assigned counsel or by retained or assigned counsel who are associated in the practice
of law, the court shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint representation and
shall personally advise each defendant of the right to the effective assistance of
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of Sullivan's breadth was not presented in this matter, and
therefore the Court would not reach an interpretation of
Sullivan.24 9 Justice Scalia concluded by stating that the question
of whether "the need for the Sullivan prophylaxis in cases of
successive representation... should be extended ... as far as the
jurisprudence of this Court is concerned, [is] an open
50
question." 2
C. The Dissenting Opinions
Four Justices dissented, filing three separate opinions. Justice
Stevens, writing for himself, noted that three issues were
25
presented in relation to the criminal adversary system. 1
Articulating those issues, he stated:
The first is whether a capital defendant's attorney has a duty to
disclose that he was representing the defendant's alleged victim at the
time of the murder. Second, is whether, assuming disclosure of the
prior representation, the capital defendant has a right to refuse the
appointment of the conflicted attorney. Third, is whether the trial
judge, who knows or should know of such prior representation, has a
duty to obtain the defendant's consent before appointing that lawyer to
25 2
represent him.

For Justice Stevens, the ultimate question presented in this
case was whether, assuming the criminal justice system
counsel, including separate representation. Unless it appears that there is good cause
to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall take such measures
as may be appropriate to protect each defendant's right to counsel.
FED R. CRIM. PROC. 44(c). The Court found it necessary to examine this rule to negate the
broad application of Sullivan to joint representation. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at
175; Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347 n.10.
249 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 176 (holding Court did not need to conclude
whether Sullivan benchmark extends beyond successive representation cases); see United
States v. Esparza-Serrano, No. 01-50436, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23153, at *13 (9th Cir.
Nov. 10, 2003) (noting that although Mickens did not consider whether conflict exists
other than joint representation, courts have applied Sullivan in other areas of possible
conflict); Allison v. Ficco, 284 F. Supp. 2d 182, 189 (D. Mass. 2003) (reaffirming that
question of Sullivan's application is left open for variety of possible conflicts).
250 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 176.
251 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 179 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that case
addressed matters essential to criminal justice system and "the constitutional right of a
person accused of a capital offense to have the effective assistance of counsel for his
defense"). See generally United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1984)
(acknowledging that constitutional right to counsel requires effective assistance of
counsel); Capone, supra note 130, at 893 (announcing three questions presented by
Justice Stevens with regard to criminal system and Court's holding in Mickens).
252 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 179-80.
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recognizes the aforementioned duties and that each was violated,
25 3
reversal is mandatory.

Having concluded that the aforementioned duties did exist and
that each was violated with respect to Walter Mickens, 2 54 Justice
Stevens asserted four reasons why the Court should set aside the
verdict. 2 5 5 First, he noted that prior case law required an inquiry
into the conflict of interest because Wood indicated that the
Court understood that "Sullivan mandates a reversal when the
trial court has failed to make an inquiry even though it 'knows or
reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists.' 2 5 6
Second, he argued that reversal is the only method available to
address the real possibility that the death penalty would not
have been imposed had the conflicted representation been
addressed. 2 57 Third, Stevens noted that the tradition of the legal
253 See id. at 180 (commenting on previously listed circumstances which may, in
effect, damage defendant's case to point where immediate reversal is essential); cf. Estelle
v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976) (highlighting example where circumstances
surrounding trial so prejudiced defendant that reversal was mandated to ensure fairness
of criminal justice system). See generally Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658 (recognizing certain
situations exist which may so heavily prejudice capital defendants that continuing
litigation is futile).
254 Justice Stevens stated:
Mickens had a constitutional right to the services of an attorney devoted solely to his
interests. That right was violated. The lawyer who did represent him had a duty to
disclose his prior representation of the victim to Mickens and to the trial judge. That
duty was violated... [T]he trial judge had a duty to "make a thorough inquiry and to
take all steps necessary to insure the fullest protection of' his right to counsel.
(citations omitted) Despite knowledge of the lawyer's prior representation, she
violated that duty.
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 185-86. See generally Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708,
722 (1948) (emphasizing trial judge's duty to inquire whether defendant is given fullest
protection of rights, particularly when no counsel was present); United States v. Taylor,
933 F.2d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that trial judge must ensure defendant
representing himself had opportunity for counsel and fullest protection of rights).
255 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 186-89 (presenting rationale behind Justice
Stevens' dissent); see also Capone, supra note 130, at 894-95 (outlining four reasons
presented by Stevens in favor of reversing conviction); Leading Cases: I. Constitutional
Law: 3. Sixth Amendment - Trial Counsel and Conflict of Interest, 116 HARV. L. REV.
242, 245 (2002) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (noting that Justice Stevens presents four
reasons supporting his argument in Mickens).
256 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 186-87 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261,
273 (1981)) (presenting first argument that prior case law mandates reversal in this
circumstance).
257 See id. at 188 (referring to presumption that counsel "for the victim of a brutal
homicide is incapable of establishing the kind of relationship with the defendant that is
essential to effective representation"); see also Capone, supra note 130, at 895 (reiterating
Justice Stevens' position of impossibility for an attorney of homicide victim to proficiently
provide criminal defendant with adequate counsel); William Hellerstein, The Line Holds,
but Death May Matter: The Supreme Court's Criminal Procedure Decisions of the 2001
Term, 19 ToURo L. REV. 1, 17 (2002) (recognizing Justice Stevens' claim that jury was
unaware of conflict when imposing death penalty).
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profession to fully disclose any conflicts of interest weighed
heavily in favor of reversal. 2 58 Finally, he noted that reversal is
the only remedy that can "maintain public confidence in the
fairness of the procedures employed in capital cases."2 59
Justice Souter's separate dissent focused on the duty of the
trial judge to inquire into the potential conflict of interest. 26 0 He
argued that the prior jurisprudence created two distinct lines of
inquiry: prospective, as in Holloway,26 1 and retrospective, as in
Sullivan.26 2 The key difference between the lines of cases is when
the duty to inquire is realized. 2 63 In the case of the prospective
conflict of interest, there "is an affirmative obligation to
258 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 188-89 (stating that "it is the only remedy that
is consistent with the legal profession's historic and universal condemnation of the
representation of conflicting interests without the full disclosure and consent of all
interested parties"); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 718 (2002) (commenting on
significance of diligent and efficient performance as essential to integrity of legal
profession); Leading Cases, supra note 255, at 246 (reiterating Justice Stevens' dissent
that reversal is preferential based on inherent nature of legal profession in disclosing
conflicts).
259 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 189. Quoting prior Court death penalty
jurisprudence, Justice Stevens asserted:
Death is a different kind of punishment from any other that may be imposed in this
country. "From the point of view of the defendant, it is different in both its severity
and its finality. From the point of view of society, the action of the sovereign in taking
the life of one of its citizens also differs dramatically from any other legitimate state
action. It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any
decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather
than caprice or emotion." (Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977)). A rule
that allows the State to foist a murder victim's lawyer onto his accused is not only
capricious; it poisons the integrity of our adversary system of justice.
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 189.
260 See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (clarifying intent of his dissent as opposed to
Justice Stevens' dissent); see also Capone, supra note 236, at 896 (discussing Justice
Souter's approach to trial judge's inquiry into potential conflicts of interest); Leading
Cases, supra note 255, at 246 (commenting on Justice Souter's discrete approach that trial
judge is responsible for ensuring no conflict exists).
261 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978) (rejecting steadfast rule that
proof of prejudice had to be shown since this would be virtually impossible to uncover); see
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 192-93 (stating that reversal in Holloway stemmed from
"the judge's failure to respond to the prospective conflict"); see also Capone, supra note
130, at 897 (discussing how Court in Holloway used prospective conflict standard to reach
decision).
262 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980) (holding that trial court need not
inquire into conflict unless it knows one previously existed); see Mickens v. Taylor, 535
U.S. at 193 (indicating that difference between Holloway and Sullivan was that Sullivan
dealt with retrospective claim for relief); see also Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1063
(11th Cir. 2002) (explaining how court must inquire into defendant's preferences and
experiences once a conflict has arisen).
263 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 194-95 (highlighting that prospective claims
for relief and retrospective claims for relief should be treated differently); see also Wheat
v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159-60 (1988) (distinguishing trial court's proper inquiry
based on time conflict arises); Capone, supra note 130, at 897 (distinguishing prospective
conflict approach in Holloway from retrospective approach of Sullivan).
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investigate a disclosed possibility that defense counsel will be
unable to act with uncompromised loyalty to his client."2 6 4
Further, "[i]t was the Judge's failure to fulfill that duty of care to
enquire further and do what might be necessary that the
Holloway Court remedied by vacating the defendant's
subsequent conviction." 2 65 Because the trial judge "was on
notice" of Saunders' prospective potential conflict of interest
arising from his prior representation of Mickens' alleged victim,
Justice Souter concluded that Holloway governed and required a
new trial for Mickens. 26 6
Justice Souter then addressed the Court's apparent
withdrawal of court required standards where conflicts are
known or should be known to the trial court. He argued that the
Court was creating "a scheme of incentives to judicial vigilance
that is weakest in those cases presenting the greatest risk of
conflict and unfair trial, and [reducing] the so-called judicial duty
to enquire into so many empty words."2 67 Essentially, Justice
Souter claimed that the Court's holding lifted a constitutional
duty which extended to trial judges to enquire into conflicts of
interest where no objection was raised and that conflict is known,
or should be known, to that judge. 268
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that the
error here fell outside the scope of the Court's prior
jurisprudence. 2 69 Instead, he argued that the error was

264 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 194 (stating how trial court should examine
potential conflicts to guarantee client can maintain proper faith in representing attorney,
which is essential to success of justice system).
265 Id. (proposing proper remedy majority should have implemented here).
266 See id. at 208 (discussing what Justice Souter feels should have been proper
majority decision and order); see also Capone, supra note 130, at 896 (maintaining that
Justice Souter argued for reversal in this situation due to lower court's failure to inquire
into potential conflict); Leading Cases, supra note 255, at 246 (noting that Justice Souter's
proposed mandatory reversal in Mickens followed precedent established in Holloway).
267 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 192.
268 See id. at 206 (arguing that majority's decision improperly eliminates
constitutional duty of court to inquire into defendant's potential conflict); see also Capone,
supra note 130, at 896 (finding that Justice Souter's dissenting opinion deemed that a
court's failure to inquire about potential conflicts would be violative of Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments). See generally Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70
(1942) (commenting that trial court's failure to ensure fair trial impedes on that person's
constitutional rights).
269 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 209 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (opining that
Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood do not create the proper framework for deciding this case).
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structural in nature, 2 70 that it therefore was not subject to
harmless error analysis, and that it required a categorical
approach and automatic reversal. 2 7 1 In support, Justice Breyer
noted that the representation afforded at the trial level was the
type that was "egregious on its face," 2 7 2 that the conflict itself
was "exacerbated by the fact that it occurred in a capital murder
27
case,"2 7 3 and that the state itself had created the conflict. 4
Thus, he concluded that the trial was inherently flawed and
2 75
reversal should be mandated on those grounds.
IV. THE DISTINGUISHING CIRCUMSTANCES OF MICKENS V. TAYLOR
AND THE RECOMMENDED ALTERNATE APPROACH

As a threshold matter, it is important to make clear what this
paper does not assert. It does not assert that the Court reached
an incorrect conclusion.
Rather, it argues that the legal
framework applied by the Mickens Court was inappropriate to
address this particular type of ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. The Mickens factual context, one where there is a conflict
arising from prior representation and not one arising from
concurrent representation, substantially differs from the earlier
cases. Further, such conflicts are inherently more prejudicial to
the defendant because the potential exists for the conflict to go
unrevealed throughout the representation. 27 6 In order to rectify
270 Id. (arguing that that "the Commonwealth created a structural defect affecting
the framework within which the trial [and sentencing] proceeds, rather than simply an
error in the trial process itself") (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310
(1991)).
271 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 209 (arguing that an error so egregious as to assign
the defendant an attorney who represented the very man he was accused of killing
warrants categorical reversal of the conviction).
272 Id. (noting that proximity in time between counsel's representation of victim and
accused magnified appearance of conflict).
273 Id. (indicating that the decisions made in a capital case are of the nature that any
type of conflict may greatly affect the manner in which strategy is created and executed).
274 See id. at 209-11 (asserting that the trial judge's own actions created the conflict
and that, in its own right, undermines the appearance of fairness in the proceeding that
followed).
275 See id. at 210 (concluding that the imposition of this death sentence "would
invariably 'diminish faith' in the fairness and integrity of our criminal justice system")
(quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U.S. 787, 811-12 (1987)).
276 See Lubowitz, supra note 102, at 455 (discussing these concerns as partial basis
for the enactment of Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Steven
H. Goldberg, The Former Client's Disqualification Gambit: A Bad Move in Pursuit of an
Ethical Anomaly, 72 MINN. L. REV. 227, 231 (1987) (noting that concurrent conflicts of
interest have always been recognized by courts as presenting very real danger to
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these specific concerns, this paper argues for an alternate
approach that would better ensure that when such situations
arise, the balance between the constitutional guarantee of
effective assistance of counsel and the fairness of the criminal
justice system are more equitably preserved.
A.

The distinguishingcircumstancesof Mickens v. Taylor

Before discussing the proposed alternate approach to a
Mickens type ineffective assistance of counsel claim, several
points of distinction between the Mickens case and the Court's
precedents should be noted. Initially, Mickens does not involve
concurrent representation, as did Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood,
discussed in Part II of this paper. Rather, Mickens relates to a
conflict of interest created by successive representation. 2 77
Successive representation is inherently different from concurrent
representation.
Successive representation will arise only in
situations where the defendant is represented by an attorney
who has a prior attorney-client relationship with the crime
victim, or another person whose interests are adverse to the
defendant, such as a material witness or friend or relative of the
crime victim. 2 7 8 The matter involving this other individual will
have already been resolved.
Conversely,
concurrent
representation arises where the representation of multiple
defendants is simultaneous and stems from the same
occurrence. 279

attorney-client loyalty). See generally Gray v. Rhode Island Dep't of Children, Youth &
Families, 937 F. Supp. 153, 160 (D. R.I. 1996) ('"oyalty to a client is... impaired when a
lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the
client because of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interest").
277 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 164 (reciting facts of the case, specifically that one
of the defendant's court-appointed attorneys had previously represented the victim in the
present case).
278 See Martinez v. Zavaras, 330 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 2003) (analyzing conflicts
resulting from defense counsel's former representation of a witness and a previous
suspect); Glover v. State, 307 S.W.2d 409 (Ark. 1991) (discussing attorney withdrawal
where the attorney's secretary was related to the defendant's victim); see also T. C.
Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (analyzing
successive representation problems in a civil context).
279 See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 357 (1980) (noting that conflict in joint
representation cases is often more difficult to prove, since "[in cases of] joint
representation of conflicting interests the evil-it bears repeating-is in what the
advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing' [emphasis in original]); United
States v. Bradshaw, 719 F.2d 907, 915 (7th Cir. 1983) (analyzing conflict alleged by
defendant in a joint-representation situation); Green, supra note 140, at 1216 (1989)
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Had Mickens been a concurrent representation case, federal
law would speak conclusively on this matter. Justice Scalia, in
his opinion for the Court, clearly pointed out that Rule 44(c) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was constructed
280
specifically to address the issue of concurrent representation.
The rule itself states, in relevant part:
(c) Joint representation. Whenever two or more defendants have been
jointly charged pursuant to Rule 8(b) or have been joined for trial
pursuant to Rule 8(b) or have been joined for trial pursuant to Rule 13,
and are represented by the same retained or assigned counsel or by
retained or assigned counsel who are associated in the practice of law,
the court shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint
representation and shall personally advise each defendant of the right
to the effective assistance of counsel, including separate
representation. Unless it appears that there is good cause to believe no
conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall take such measures
28
as may be appropriate to protect each defendant's right to counsel. 1
But while Justice Scalia relied on Rule 44(c) and the advisory
notes accompanying it as evidence that Congress specifically
intended not to apply such requirements to situations of
successive representation, he failed to note that the rule itself
was a codification of the Court's decision in Holloway.282 Thus,
reliance on
its direction
in instances of successive
28
3
representation
seems misplaced since Holloway did not raise
that issue. Further, the Congressional notes accompanying Rule
44(c) suggest that Congress sought only to address the dangers
(arguing that under the relevant ethical standards, a successive conflict of interest is
viewed as less serious than a concurrent conflict).
280 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 173 (indicating that Rule 44(c) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure was designed only to address concurrent representation and
not successive representation).
281 FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 44 (as quoted in Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 307, n. 6).
282 See FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 44 advisory committee's note on 1979 amendments
(citing Holloway as guidance behind proposed change to rule); see also Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1977) (discussing these issues and noting that "a rule
requiring a defendant to show that a conflict of interests [had] prejudiced him in some
specific fashion would not be susceptible of intelligent, even-handed application"); United
States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98, 105 (8th Cir. 1977) (placing responsibility on the trial
judge to inquire about joint representation by appointed or retained counsel, and noting
that "without such an inquiry a finding of knowing and intelligent waiver will seldom, if
ever, be sustained by this Court").
283 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 175 (noting that required inquiry into
successive representation was not addressed by rule); see also Beets v. Collins, 65 F.3d
1258, 1266 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that Rule 44 standards had not been extended to
successive representation situations). See generally Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435,
1451 n.7 (7th Cir. 1997) (reviewing state and federal case law).
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arising from concurrent representation, and did not, at that time,
consider those that arise in successive representation. 2 84 The
implications of this reliance on Rule 44(c), however, will be
revisited in Part V of this comment.
Second, Mickens is clearly different from the type of conflict
(known or should be known) addressed in Sullivan. The Sullivan
case involved the representation of the first of three codefendants who were each tried separately. Although a good
case can be made as to the existence of a conflict that was
foreseeable to the court, an equally strong case may be asserted
that the conflict had not ripened until after Sullivan's
conviction. 2 8 5 It was only at that time that it became apparent
that alternate strategies were adopted in his co-defendants'
cases.
In Mickens, the conflict existed from the moment
Saunders was assigned to represent Mickens at trial. The sole
reason that Walter Mickens was not aware of the conflict was
because that information was withheld from him. 2 86
Third, even though all the relevant inquiries were conducted
post-trial, Mickens is not a case about addressing a retrospective
284 See generally United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1055 (2d Cir. 1976)
(expressing concerns forming the basis for the role of the trial judge in preventing jointrepresentation conflicts as addressed by Rule 44(c)); see also Lawriw, 568 F.2d at 104
(expressing the need for enlarged role of trial judge: "because the conflicts are often subtle
it is not enough to rely upon counsel, who may not be totally disinterested, to make sure
that each of his joint clients has made an effective waiver."); United States v. Johnson,
131 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1096 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (declining to apply Rule 44(c) to a successive
representation conflict where it was not likely that prejudice would result or confidence
would be breached by allowing counsel to cross-examine former client).
285 See United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512, 521 (3rd Cir. 1979)
(noting that the mere existence of dual representation-which was obvious to the court
from the start of the case-is insufficient to establish prejudice to the client, but finding
sufficient evidence after reviewing a post-trial hearing record where counsel admitted to
differing strategies which had prejudiced the defendant for the purpose of protecting
codefendants); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 YALE L.J.
407, 416 (1998) (discussing reasons for client waiver of obvious conflicts of interests,
including the inability of co-defendants to afford individual attorneys as in Sullivan). See
generally Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) (holding that the duty of the
court to guarantee constitutionally effective assistance of counsel is "of equal importance"
with the duty to see that the defendant is not prejudiced by an improper joint
representation).
286 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 165 ("[petitioner's court-appointed attorney] did not
disclose to the court, his co-counsel, or petitioner that he had previously represented [the
victim]"); cf. Sullivan, 593 F.2d at 518 (noting that the petitioner, when appointed counsel
by the court, was aware of the joint representation and, when told by counsel "not to
worry" and that "they would represent all three defendants," petitioner agreed to the
representation). See generally Luther H. Soules III, Proposed Conflict Of Interest And
ConfidentialityRules, 33 ST. MARY'S L.J. 753, 809 (2002) (proposing an amendment to the
Texas Code of Ethics requiring attorneys to affirmatively disclose all potential conflicts in
successive representation situations).
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conflict of interest. Although it is unclear whether Mickens
would have requested different counsel had the prior
representation been revealed, Mickens, unlike the parties in
Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood, could only have been in a position
to address his conflict through disclosure. It is abundantly clear
that two individuals, Bryan Saunders and the trial judge, knew
about the conflict of interest prior to the commencement of any
formal proceedings. 287 Mickens was never afforded the
opportunity to raise the objection to his representation. In this
way, the situation in Mickens is clearly different from the
multiple-concurrent-representation
cases.
When there is
multiple-concurrent-representation, any of the co-defendants
presumably can look to his side and recognize the physical
presence of his co-defendant. 2 88 The trial court and trial attorney
are also presumably aware that such a conflict exists. Thus, it is
much easier to address such circumstances retrospectively, even
if no objection is raised. Again, this is the exact situation the
Federal Rules address. 28 9
A key question that the Court failed to address in Mickens was
what would have happened had Mickens raised an objection to
being represented by Saunders. Upon a showing of good cause,
counsel may be replaced or reassigned by the court.2 90 Given the
interpretation of Strickland, Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood in

287 See Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d 586, 600-01 (E.D.Va. 1999) (outlining the
circumstances of the representation).
288 See Sullivan, 593 F.2d at 518 (noting that the decision to enter into joint
representation was the choice of the codefendants together). See generally Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978) (discussing pretrial hearings where the court failed to
properly inquire when joint representation was made clear); Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336,
344 (Wyo. 1987) (noting that at irrespective of whether a conflict actually existed in a
joint representation situation, at least the potential for such a conflict should have been
clear before trial).
289 FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 44(c) (placing a burden on the trial court in joint
representation situations); Lawriw, 568 F.2d at 105 (emphasizing affirmative role of trial
court inquiry in joint representation cases); see also Hamilton v. Ford, 969 F.2d 1006,
1011 (11th Cir. 1992) (overturning a conviction where court failed to make proper inquiry
into joint representation on first day of trial).
290 See LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 11.4(b) (indicating that a showing of good cause may
be the sole avenue to replacement of appointed defense counsel); cf. United States v.
Conti, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18398 at *12 (6th Cir. July 24, 1992) (upholding trial court's
decision not to replace counsel where petitioner failed to show good cause); People v.
Miranda, 665 N.Y.S.2d 507, 508 (N.Y. App Div. 1997) (upholding denial of petitioner's
request for new counsel because petitioner "failed to demonstrate good cause for the
substitution").
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other courts, new counsel would have presumably been assigned
to resolve this conflict of interest. 2 9 1
it should follow that, absent the requisite knowledge necessary
to raise such an objection, the post-trial analysis should focus on
the point at which the objection would have been raised had
Walter Mickens been informed of the facts. Justice Souter, in his
dissenting opinion, clearly supported this contention. 292 He
stated, in comparing the facts of Holloway and Sullivan, that "a
prospective risk of conflict subject to judicial notice is treated
differently from a retrospective claim that a completed proceeding
was tainted by conflict."2 93
Two facts in Mickens seem most significant to trigger a
prospective Holloway type scrutiny. First, Walter Mickens was
unaware that his attorney had represented the victim until that
fact was uncovered by his federal habeas counsel. 2 94 Second, the
trial judge herself created that conflict. 29 5 "When the problem
comes to the trial court's attention before any potential conflict
has become actual, the court has a duty to act prospectively to
assess the risk and, if the risk is not too remote, to eliminate it or
291 See Sutton v. Strack, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1132 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2001)
(raising the issue of successive representation where the link is between the defendant
and a state's witness, and subsequently finding a conflict of interest that adversely
affected the representation); see also Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d 296, 303 (2d Cir.
1995) (holding the trial court to its Rule 44(c) duty and reversing the petitioner's
conviction for lack of inquiry); United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1994)
(citing Holloway, holding that reversal of conviction is automatic when a possible conflict
has been entirely ignored by the trial court).
292 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 203 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that
even in the absence of proper objection by the petitioner, the trial judge should be more
alert to potential conflicts - especially where the petitioner could not have known the
relevant facts).
293 Id. at 193 (emphasis added) (arguing for differing treatment of joint and
successive representation conflict claims).
294 See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F. 3d 348, 354 (4th Cir. 2001) (asserting that Saunders
never disclosed to either Mickens or co-counsel his prior representation of the victim); see
also Brief for Petitioner at 2, Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002) (No. 00-9285) (noting
that Judge Foster did not inquire into "a possible conflict of interest, and Saunders did
not disclose his connection to the victim"). See generally Capone, supra note 130, at 881
(discussing the repercussions of Saunders' failure to disclose his prior representation to
the presiding judge).
295 See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d. at 354 (revealing that trial judge who dismissed
Saunders from representing Hall subsequently assigned him to represent Mickens);
Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d 586, 600 (E.D.Va. 1999) (noting that Judge Foster of
the JDR Court appointed Saunders to represent Mickens for the murder of Hall); see also
Grunewald, supra note 6, at 138 (acknowledging that prior to Hall's death, a juvenile
court judge had appointed Saunders to represent Hall on assault and concealed weapons
charges, and that the same judge appointed Saunders to represent Mickens for the
murder of Hall).
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to render it acceptable through a defendant's knowing and
intelligent waiver."2 96 In essence, time should have stopped for
Walter Mickens, and the analysis should have been conducted
with an eye towards the future and not the past.
B. An Alternate Approach
Having exposed the factors that distinguish Mickens from the
Court's prior jurisprudence in this area, it is possible to present
an alternate approach. Mickens presented an issue of first
impression. Mickens involved an unobjected to conflict of interest
because the conflict itself went undisclosed to the party affected
by it.297
Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood each dealt with
concurrent representation. 2 98 This factual distinction, in its own
right, seems to justify a different solution. It is asserted that, in
this setting, proof of an undisclosed conflict of interest by clear
and convincing evidence should create a rebuttable presumption
of prejudice that the state must likewise overcome by clear and
convincing evidence. This approach would not only create a
workable standard that could be universally applied, it would
also address the arguments raised by both the majority and
dissenting opinions in Mickens.
The successful raising of this claim is predicated upon several
factors. First, in order to be successful, the claimant must be
able to prove that the conflict of interest was both undisclosed
and unknown to the defendant prior to, and throughout, the trial.
296 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 193 (emphasis added).
297 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 165 (pointing out that under Virginia law, juvenile
case files are confidential and may not generally be disclosed without a court order, but
petitioner learned about Saunders' prior representation when a clerk mistakenly
produced Hall's file to federal habeas counsel); see also Capone, supra note 130, at 888-89
(pointing out that Mickens did not learn of this conflict until the new counsel appointed
for his federal habeas corpus proceedings discovered it upon examination of Timothy
Hall's file in the Newport News Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court). See generally
Anne M. Voigts, Note, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural Default, Habeas
Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1130-36
(1999) (citing undisclosed conflicts of interest as an issue that may require some
development of the record in order to evaluate either the competence of the attorney or
the alleged prejudice).
298 See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981) (deciding that the appearance of a
violation of petitioners' due process rights was so great as to require remand to determine
of whether a conflict of interest existed); cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980)
(declaring that a possible conflict of interest was not enough to establish ineffective
assistance of counsel); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (holding that three
defendants' representation by a single attorney, over their objection, had not violated
their right to effective assistance of counsel).
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Second, the successful claimant must be able to prove that both
the court and trial counsel were aware of, or should have been
aware of., the alleged conflict. Upon proof by clear and convincing
evidence of both these threshold matters, the State should be
afforded the opportunity to rebut the presumption of prejudice by
presenting clear and convincing evidence that the conflict did not
adversely affect the representation.
Under this approach, as applied to the facts of Mickens, one
seemingly reaches the same result as the Court. As to the
threshold questions of client ignorance and court notice, the
findings made at each level of the habeas proceedings support
Mickens' contention of a conflict of interest. Those having the
knowledge of Saunders' prior representation simply did not
disclose that information to Mickens. In fact, with respect to
Bryan Saunders, a duty of disclosure exists pursuant to Rule 1.7
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 299 The rule states
that a "conflict of interest exists if: there is a significant risk that
the representation of one or more clients will be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former
client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer." 300
Among the four requirements to resolve such conflicts, Rule 1.7
states that "a lawyer may represent a client if: each affected
client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing."3 0 1 Clearly,
299 See William J. Wernz, The Ethics of Large Law Firms-Responsesand Reflections,
16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 187 (2002) (stating in the last decade the law of conflicts of
interest for lawyers has become increasingly complicated and pointing out The
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers devotes 181 pages to conflicts); see
also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, preamble, at xviii (2003) (defining "consultation"
as a "communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to
appreciate the significance of the matter in question."). See generally Lissa Griffin, The
Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
1241 (2001) (comparing and contrasting British and American disclosure rules and the
review of resulting wrongful convictions).
300 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2003) (emphasis added).
301 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) (2003) (emphasis added). Rule
1.7(b), in its entirety states:
(b)
Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under
paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent
and diligent representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against
another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding
before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (b) (2003).
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there was no disclosure and no written waiver in this case, and
thus an outright violation of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct occurred.
This should raise a rebuttable presumption of prejudice
against the state which can be overcome only by a showing of
clear and convincing evidence that Saunders' representation of
Mickens was not adversely affected. The state did in fact create
this problem, and neither the trial judge nor the attorney
assigned to the case did anything to alleviate it. However, the
state's culpability is overcome by other factors. Walter Mickens
maintained his innocence throughout his relationship with Bryan
Saunders. 302 He did this despite the overwhelming evidence
against him,303 including testimony regarding his own
confessions of the crime. 3 04 Given this, the state should not have
to shoulder the burdens of retrying an individual who likely did
not suffer as a result of the conflict it created.
In this
circumstance, it is clear that the verdict reached was reasonable
based upon the facts presented at trial.
However, the situation could easily be different. Had Walter
Mickens attempted to assert the alternate defense of consensual
sodomy, it might have ruled out the possibility of the death
sentence. 30 5 In this scenario, the claim of prejudice, when
considered with the knowledge of Saunders' prior representation,
would likely provide a sound basis for a reviewing court to rule
differently. Here, the question of Saunders' state of mind in
302 See Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d 586, 607 (E.D. Va. 1999); see also Capone,
supra note 130, at 889 (stating that Saunders did not develop any line of defense based on
a consensual sexual encounter or investigate into whether Hall may have been a
prostitute). See generally Cheryl Hanna, Sex is Not a Sport: Consent and Violence in
Criminal Law, 42 B.C. L. REV 239 (2001) (discussing the defense of consent and innocence
of violent crime).
303 The evidence adduced against Walter Mickens at trial included: Mickens
knowledge of the manner in which Hall was murdered at the time of his April 4, 1992
arrest, Mickens' confession at the time of his April 5, 1992 arrest, DNA evidence that
linked Walter Mickens to the crime scene, and Walter Mickens confession to a cell mate
on March 26, 1993. See Mickens v. Commonwealth, 442 S.E.2d 678, 682-84 (Va. 1994).
304 See Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2001); Matthew S. Nichols,
Case Note: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: Mickens v. Taylor, 13
CAP. DEF. J. 393, 393 (2001) (citing Tyrone Brister's testimony that he and Mickens
shared a courthouse holding cell on March 26, 1993. Brister testified that when he asked
Mickens why he was there. Mickens answered, 'They said I stabbed somebody 140
something times in the head." According to Brister, Mickens then lowered his voice and
added "which I did"). See generally Edward L. Wilkinson, Conflicts of Interest in Texas
Criminal Cases, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 171 (2002) (discussing other cases where confessions
existed in conflict cases).
305 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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convincing Mickens to forego the claim of consensual sodomy
would weigh very heavily. A reviewing court could very likely
conclude that by convincing Mickens to forego a strategy that
could have spared his life even if found guilty, Saunders' prior
representation and relationship with the victim affected his
ability to fairly represent Mickens. However, Walter Mickens did
not assert any defense based upon consent until the federal
habeas proceedings.3 06 While it is certainly arguable that
Mickens' trial attorney could have, and likely should have,
considered this defense in light of the weighty sentence a guilty
verdict carried, Saunders did not err in carrying out his client's
wishes.
This proposed alternate approach alleviates several concerns
raised by both the majority and dissenting Justices in Mickens.
Justice Scalia, in the majority opinion, expressed a concern about
the "risk of conferring a windfall upon a defendant" if
circumstances such as those in Mickens would require mandatory
reversal. 30 7
Conversely, Justice Souter expressed his own
concern about the absence of any incentive for a trial judge to
ensure a fair trial by inquiring where there is the potential for a
conflict of interest. Absent such a duty, he felt that the system
itself would suffer by not rectifying these types of conflicts before
they had truly ripened and that a judge would not be held
accountable for such misdeeds. 308 Also, along a separate line,
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg found that no manageable
standard at all existed in this atypical scenario and felt that a

306 See Nichols, supra note 304, at 400 (pointing out that the court agreed that trial
counsel failed to raise the defense of consent to the sodomy charge because the strategy
was not viable based on the wounds inflicted on Hall and Mickens' denial of ever meeting
Hall); see also Reimer, supra note 156, at 361 (discussing the defense strategy and its
failure to assert a defense of consent), Grunewald, supra note 6, at 137 (noting Saunders'
failure to raise the defense of victim consent, failure to investigate into negative
information about Hall, and failure to inform the sentencing court that Hall's mother had
filed the assault charge that was pending at the time of Hall's death).
307 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 (2002).
308 See id. at 201 (Souter, J., dissenting) (posing the question, "[w]hy excuse a judge's
breach of judicial duty just because a lawyer has fallen down in his own ethics or is short
on competence?"); cf. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375,.386-87 (1966) (noting judge's duty to
conduct hearing regarding competency to stand trial). See generally Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) (stating "of equal importance with the duty of the court to
see that an accused has the assistance of counsel is its duty to refrain from embarrassing
counsel in the defense of an accused by insisting, or indeed, even suggesting, that counsel
undertake to concurrently represent interests which might diverge from those of his first
client, when the possibility of that divergence is brought home to the court.").
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categorical approach requiring reversal would prove more
30 9
workable for redressing such claims.
The proposed alternative approach would address all three of
these concerns. First, as to the "windfall" concern raised by
Justice Scalia, although a defendant's successful showing of the
first two criteria would create a rebuttable presumption of
prejudice, defeated only by clear and convincing evidence, this
standard is not overly burdensome. It seems reasonable to
conclude that a District Court will make the necessary findings
to show that the conflict did not adversely affect the
representation if the alternative may result in a reversed
conviction. Arguably, that was the case at the District Court
level in Mickens. Reversal, then, would be reserved for scenarios
where the defendant himself did not advocate the position that
led to his conviction; rather it would be reserved for cases where
counsel specifically influenced the case.
Second, in reference to the concern raised by Justice Souter, a
rebuttable presumption of prejudice would create a sufficient
incentive for trial judges to explore potential conflicts of interest.
It seems likely that a judge, on notice of a potential conflict,
would take the few moments necessary to conduct a brief inquiry
into the conflict if that judge knew that any ensuing trial or
conviction would be subject to such a review.
Third, as to the need for the categorical approach advocated by
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, the alternate approach
accomplishes two things. First, although it is not the categorical
approach suggested, it does effectively remove this type of
conflict from the strict confines of Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood.
By creating a rebuttable presumption of prejudice in Mickens
type cases, the alternative approach shifts the burden to the
state allowing for greater protection to those charged with
crimes.
Second, the more definite, rebuttable presumption
approach provides a more workable standard than a categorical
309 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 209 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood do not provide a sensible or coherent framework for dealing
with those cases at all). See generally note 298, supra and accompanying text (discussing
these precedents); Gregory G. Sarno, Circumstances Giving Rise to PrejudicialConflict of
Interests Between Criminal Defendant and Defense Counsel - Federal Cases, 53 A.L.R.
FED. 140 (2003) (collecting and analyzing the modern federal decisions determining what
circumstances give rise to a conflict of interests between a criminal defendant and defense
counsel).
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reversal. The categorical reversal would likely open a door for
abuse that would ultimately lead to unjustifiable reversals if a
defendant or an attorney intentionally avoided any questions
about such conflicts or purposely remained silent. Ultimately,
under a categorical approach, cases factually similar to Mickens
would be reversed although a rebuttable presumption could
likely be overcome, as would likely be the case where an
intentional lack of disclosure occurred solely in order to leave the
door open for reversal. The only way for a reviewing court to
discover such a scenario would be for the attorney to disclose
those intentions, which would be unlikely given the implications
for that attorney.
V. WHAT DOES MICKENS V. TAYLOR IMPLY FOR THE FUTURE?

With the decision in Mickens, The United States Supreme
Court has set a very high bar for defendants in criminal
proceedings to establish that a conflict of interest has adversely
affected
the representation
guaranteed by the Sixth
3
0
Amendment. 1 Today, a defendant who was himself a victim of a
trial court's neglect of its duty to inquire into a conflict of interest
that is known or should have been known, must not only show
that the conflict existed, but that it adversely affected the
representation. 3 11 Not only does this contradict the Holloway and
Sullivan Courts' directives for addressing such scenarios, it
seems likely that its application to future cases will only
exacerbate the problem.
310 See, e.g., Pegg v. United States, 253 F.3d 1274, 1275 (2001) (finding no causal link,
and therefore no adverse effect, between the conflict of interest and several alternative
defense strategies that were not pursued); cf. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 65859 (1984) (holding that the denial of counsel is so likely to prejudice the accused that the
cost of litigating the denial's actual prejudice is unnecessary). See generally Herbert,
supra note 157, at 1275 (pointing out the Court's holding that the trial court's failure to
inquire into the potential conflict, despite its duty to do so, did not relieve Mickens of his
burden to show that the conflict adversely affected his counsel's performance).
311 See Herbert, supra note 157, at 1271 (stating under such circumstances the
defendant must show, first, that an actual conflict existed, and second, that the conflict
adversely affected counsel's performance); see, e.g., Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 689
(4th Cir. 2002) (citing the prevailing Sullivan rule that "[o]n a conflict of interest claim,
petitioner must show (1) that his attorney had an actual conflict of interest and (2) that
the conflict of interest "adversely affected his lawyer's performance"); United States v.
Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1011 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that "[i]f a defendant carries his
burden of showing an actual conflict of interest, a court must then consider whether the
conflict adversely affected his representation").
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In the late 1970's and early 1980's, the concern for conflicts of
interest in this area was perhaps limited mostly to the problem of
concurrent representation. However, in today's criminal justice
system, this seems impractical. The pool of defendants, and
those previously represented by counsel, is not shrinking. 3 12 In
fact, it only seems more likely that the successive representation
scenario will arise with greater frequency. Perhaps the facts of
subsequent cases will not be quite as egregious as those
presented here, but the principle is still the same. The defendant
suffers from a lack of what is constitutionally guaranteed. In
Mickens, as in any similar successive representation case, a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights have taken, and will take, a
back seat to substantive determinations of guilt or innocence.
Those charged with crimes are
This is not acceptable.
guaranteed a fair trial, and the effective assistance of council is a
cornerstone of this fairness. 313
Justice Scalia attempts to read into the Advisory Committee
notes accompanying Federal Rule 44(c) Congress' intent to
3 14
extend the rule to successive representation cases.
Nevertheless, such a proposal has never existed. Rule 44(c) was
enacted following the Court's decision in Holloway.315 In fact, a
careful analysis of the history of Rule 44 notes that subsection (c)
Data,
available at
Crime
and
Arrest
Bureau
of Justice,
312 See
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dtdata.htm#crime (last visited April 17, 2003) (providing
estimated United States crime statistics from 1960 to 1998, and showing that, although
there has been a slight decrease in crime since 1994, United States crime has increased
substantially since the 1978 decision in Holloway).
313 See, e.g., Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) ('The effective assistance of
counsel ... is a constitutional requirement of due process"); see also Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942) (stating that the sixth amendment guarantee of
assistance of counsel must be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court's ineffective
appointment of counsel). See generally Gabriel, supra note 63, at 1261 (framing the
effective assistance of counsel as a procedural right and establishing the necessary
relationship between this right and the workings of the adversary system).
314 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 175 (stating the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure treat concurrent representation and prior representation differently, requiring
a trial court to inquire into the likelihood of conflict whenever jointly charged defendants
are represented by a single attorney (Rule 44(c)), but not when counsel previously
represented another defendant in a substantially related matter, even where the trial
court is aware of the prior representation); see also FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 44(c)
(promulgating the procedure for the appointment of counsel and discussing the right to
counsel); Advisory Committee's Notes on 1979 Amendments to FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 44(c).
315 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978) (theorizing that in a case of
joint representation of conflicting interests the evil.., is in what the advocate finds
himself compelled to refrain from doing. . . and this "makes it virtually impossible to
assess the impact of the conflict"); cf. FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 44(c). See generally Green,
supra note 140, at 1201 (discussing the Holloway and Rule 44).
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was likely a response to Holloway, as evidenced by a specific
citation to that decision in amending the rule. 3 16 At that time, no
proposal for applying it in successive representation cases was
made, nor has one been advanced more recently. However, the
fact that Congress has been silent on an issue should not be
dispositive.
It signals, instead, an absence of consideration
where a successive representation conflict is the issue and not a
disapproval of recognizing the need for relief. Nonetheless,
criminal defendants must now live with a more stringent view of
what is a harmless error resulting from a conflict of interest.
Another result of the Court's holding is acknowledged in the
dissenting opinion by Justice Souter. Before Mickens, a trial
court had a duty to inquire into potential conflicts of interest if
the court knew or should have known of the risk of conflict. 3 17 A
trial judge, however, has now effectively been absolved of the
duty to keep an eye on the integrity of counsel's ethical obligation
to disclose conflicts. 3 18 This is the case because after Mickens, the
standard of review in successive representation conflict of
interest cases is harmless error. Without the threat of a more
stringent post-trial evaluation, it is likely that judges will not
explore unobjected to potential conflicts to the extent that they
would with the proposed alternative approach.
Apart from the rhetoric, it seems that a mere question or two
from the trial judge would be sufficient to explore and resolve
potential conflicts arising from successive representation.
316 See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
317 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 201 (Souter, J., dissenting) (reading Holloway
to impose a duty to act on a judge who is on notice of a risk of prospective conflict of
interest); see also Sixth Amendment - Trial Counsel and Conflict of Interest, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 242, 249 (2002) (pointing out that a trial court's duty to inquire into potential
conflicts of interest, which originated in Holloway, is an important component of the same
constitutional principles underlying the harmless error exception); see also 5 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 27.6(d) (2d ed. Supp. 2002) (stating "[t]he very premise
of the constitutionally mandated inquiry was that postconviction review was not adequate
protection where such special circumstances existed").
318 See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 187 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that Wood
cites Sullivan explicitly in order to make a factual distinction: "In a circumstance, such as
in Wood, in which the judge knows or should know of the conflict, no showing of adverse
effect is required. But when, as in Sullivan, the judge lacked this knowledge, such a
showing is required."); see also Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 722 (1948) (holding
that it is "the solemn duty of a... judge before whom a defendant appears without
counsel to make a thorough inquiry and to take all steps necessary to insure the fullest
protection of this constitutional right at every stage of the proceedings."). But see Cuyler
v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980) (stating that it is true that in a situation of retained
counsel, "unless the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict
exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry").
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Simply placing the onus on trial judges at a meeting in the pretrial stages of a proceeding to ask defense counsel about any
known conflicts that might adversely affect the representation
would be sufficient to establish a record of inquiry. As previously
noted, the Model Rules of Professional Ethics already extend this
duty to trial attorneys. However, Mickens shows that the system
could certainly benefit from a check designed to more completely
protect an individual's Sixth Amendment rights.
Does such a standard create an undue burden on our court
system?
Clearly not.
People are not charged, tried, and
convicted on the same day.
Countless hours are spent in
preparation. In the normal criminal proceeding several pre-trial
conferences are often held. The judge is likely to be present at
most, if not all, of these hearings. An inquiry into any potential
conflicts of interest, even if not known to the court, would not
take any appreciable amount of time. It would, however, help
assure that a situation akin to Mickens does not arise again.
This simple solution would safeguard the effective representation
of counsel that the Sixth Amendment demands.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Court's decision in Mickens v. Taylor had a profound effect
on trial procedure. It gave attorneys a little more leeway to
consider the ethical boundaries of their profession, and a little
more leeway in identifying what is considered a conflict of
interest. The Court also lessened the day-to-day workload of a
trial judge by removing any duty to inquire into counsel's
conflicts of interest that may potentially adversely affect a
criminal defendant, even if the trial court should be aware that a
conflict exists. This all translates into a system of criminal
justice that has become a little less fair to those charged with a
crime, and a little more deferential to the actions of the State.

